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Insolvency and Bankruptcy: No indirectly backtrack or demand fresh modifications from approved resolution plans

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In Sanjay Dave v. Andhra Bank Ltd. & Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 12264-12266 of 2024, decided on May 27, 2026), the Supreme Court of India adjudicated a critical corporate insolvency dispute concerning the finality of Committee of Creditors (CoC) approved resolution plans and the boundaries of a Successful Resolution Applicant’s (SRA) liability under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). The appeal was preferred by Sanjay Dave—the Promoter/Director of the Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise (MSME) Corporate Debtor, M/s. Oracle Home Textiles Limited—against an order of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) which had upheld a liquidation order and the forfeiture of his Rs. 1 crore Earnest Money Deposit (EMD).

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that once a resolution plan is approved by the CoC, the SRA cannot indirectly backtrack or demand fresh modifications by label-shaming transaction documents like Letters of Intent (LoIs) as “conditional”. Invoking the doctrines of estoppel and approbate and reprobate, the Apex Court ruled that structural risks—such as ongoing third-party litigation or staff salary liabilities—had been explicitly accepted by the appellant during CoC meetings. Consequently, his failure to submit a performance guarantee amounted to a calculated attempt to renege from the plan, justifying the absolute forfeiture of the EMD and reinforcing the unassailable primacy of the CoC’s commercial wisdom to force mandatory liquidation.

1. Factual Matrix & Procedural History

  • The Resolution Baseline: The Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against M/s. Oracle Home Textiles Limited was admitted on August 9, 2018. The appellant, a Promoter/Director of the MSME Corporate Debtor, submitted a Resolution Plan pursuant to an explicit window allowed under the Code. On May 10, 2021, the appellant was notified that his final plan had been approved by the CoC with an overwhelming 99.90% voting majority.
  • The Friction over LoIs: On May 23, 2021, the Resolution Professional (RP) issued a Letter of Intent (LoIs). The appellant vehemently objected to specific clauses in this and subsequent LoIs, characterizing them as “conditional”:
    1. The Prospective Applicants Clause: The LoI stipulated that the plan’s approval was subject to orders reserved by the NCLT regarding pending applications filed by third-party Prospective Resolution Applicants (PRAs).
    2. The Labor Risk Clause: The LoI incorporated a provision shifting all past and operational financial risks/costs stemming from court cases filed by staff, employees, or workers exclusively onto the SRA.
  • Forfeiture and Deadlock: Because the appellant refused to sign the LoIs and failed to deposit a Performance Bank Guarantee (PBG), the RP issued consecutive revised LoIs. Upon final non-compliance with the third LoI, the RP officially forfeited the appellant’s EMD of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore) on August 2, 2021.
  • The Shift to Liquidation: As the CIRP statutory timeline expired on February 21, 2023, without a viable implemented plan, the CoC voted in its 33rd meeting with a 99.61% majority to push the Corporate Debtor into liquidation. The NCLT dismissed the appellant’s applications against the forfeiture/LoI clauses and allowed the liquidation, a decision subsequently upheld in its entirety by the NCLAT on October 29, 2024.

2. Legal Issues & Institutional Determinations

A. The Illusion of Conditional Letters of Intent (Issue I)

The appellant argued that forcing an SRA to accept a plan contingent upon third-party litigation outcomes or open-ended legal hazards made the transaction legally conditional. The Supreme Court flatly rejected this premise:

  • The Primacy of Judicial Decrees: Justice K.V. Viswanathan observed that stating an LoI is subject to a judicial body’s final order is merely a reflection of the rule of law. Even if left unwritten, any final plan remains structurally subservient to prevailing judicial determinations unless overturned by a superior appellate forum.
  • Prior Knowledge: Corporate records and CoC minutes established that the appellant was physically present during meetings where the PRAs’ claims were debated. He could not pretend to be taken by surprise to escape a binding business commitment.

B. The Doctrine of Approbate and Reprobate (Issue II)

The Court deeply evaluated the appellant’s conduct across successive CoC assemblies:

  • Explicit Acquiescence: Relying on State Bank of India v. M.J. James (2022), the Court defined acquiescence as a direct or silent assent where a party stands by and confirms an arrangement, thereby abandoning alternate equitable choices.
  • Blowing Hot and Cold Prohibited: Regarding the shifting of staff and worker liability risks, the minutes of the 27th CoC meeting clearly recorded that the bank representatives explicitly informed the appellant that labor cost variations were his calculated risk, and the appellant had recorded his unambiguous agreement to the same. Under Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao (1956) and RIICO v. Diamond & Gem Development Corp. (2013), a commercial entity cannot accept the beneficial components of an approved transaction and subsequently attempt to dismantle its binding parts to extract separate advantages.

C. Absolute Irrevocability of CoC-Approved Plans (Issue III)

The Court used this dispute to re-emphasize the foundational boundaries laid down in Ebix Singapore Pvt. Ltd. v. CoC of Educomp Solutions Ltd. (2022):

  • No Post-Approval Retractions: Once the CoC exercises its commercial wisdom and approves a resolution plan, the SRA is completely precluded from raising subsequent observations or pushing for modified terms. The submission of a plan signals that the resolution applicant has thoroughly analyzed structural data and market vulnerabilities.
  • Protection of Timelines: Allowing an applicant to renegotiate or orchestrate an exit based on tactical clauses would introduce an unregulated tier of negotiations, destroying asset values and stultifying the strict statutory outer limit of 330 days mandated under Section 12(3) of the IBC. The Court labeled the appellant’s objections a clear “subterfuge” and a clever ploy designed to bypass the absolute ban on direct plan withdrawals.

D. Validity of EMD Forfeiture and Liquidation Thresholds (Issue IV)

  • Contractual Enforcement: The Request For Resolution Plan (RFRP) under clause 1.9.4 explicitly empowers the lender to forfeit the EMD if the successful applicant misses the timeline to submit a performance guarantee or defaults on regulatory milestones. Because the appellant sat on his hands during relaxed timelines (a 45-day COVID-pandemic extension which eventually shrank back to the standard 7 days upon non-compliance), the RP’s forfeiture of the Rs. 1 crore was entirely sound and legal.
  • Paramount Nature of Commercial Wisdom: Citing Manish Kumar v. Union of India (2021) and Sashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank (2019), the Court reiterated that Section 33(2) and its 2019 Explanation grant the CoC the absolute, unreviewable legislative right to ring the death knell of a Corporate Debtor and mandate liquidation at any stage before a plan’s final judicial affirmation. This collective business choice is completely non-justiciable.

3. Final Directives and Decretal Orders

The Supreme Court rejected the appeals with the following definitive mandates:

  • Appeals Dismissed: Civil Appeal Nos. 12264-12266 of 2024 are dismissed for being entirely devoid of legal merit.
  • Forfeiture and Orders Upheld: The separate concurrent findings of the NCLT and NCLAT validating the forfeiture of the Rs. 1,00,00,000/- EMD and rejecting the appellant’s applications are affirmed.
  • Vacation of Interim Protections: All historical interim stay orders operational against the insolvency or liquidation proceedings stand formally vacated.
  • Liquidation Enforcement: The Respondent No. 3 (Liquidator) is directed to proceed immediately with the remaining statutory phases of the liquidation of M/s. Oracle Home Textiles Limited in strict compliance with the timelines of the Code.
  • Costs: The matter stands disposed of with no order as to costs.

2026 INSC 580

Sanjay Dave V. Andhra Bank Ltd. & Ors. (D.O.J. 27.05.2026)

2026 INSC 580 click here to view full text of judgment

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Liberty Overlooked: Supreme Court Quashes Preventive Detention Order and Imposes Costs

September 30, 2026 No Comments

In this criminal appeal, the Supreme Court of India set aside a judgment of the Allahabad High Court and quashed an order of preventive detention issued under the National Security Act, 1980 (NSA) against the appellant. The bench held that a confessional statement made to a police officer—particularly one alleged to have been extracted under torture and threats of death—cannot form the sole or primary basis for forming subjective satisfaction to sustain preventive detention, as it violates Article 20(3) of the Constitution and Section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA). The Court further ruled that the detaining authority relied heavily on undisclosed and unsupplied material (such as missing CCTV footage and erased phone data), and that the detention order was an improper attempt to subvert judicial orders granting bail in regular criminal cases, effectively making the process a punishment. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, ordered the immediate release of the appellant, and imposed costs of Rs. 10 lakhs on the State.

  • Inadmissibility of Police Confessions for Detention: The Supreme Court held that an extra-judicial or police confessional statement, which is inherently suspect and barred as substantive evidence under Section 23 of the BSA and Article 20(3) of the Constitution, cannot serve as the sole foundation for subjective satisfaction in preventive detention. The court overruled contrary views in earlier precedents like Suman v. State of Tamil Nadu to this extent.
  • Missing and Undisclosed Material: The detaining authority’s reliance on crucial material such as CCTV footage, video recordings, and mobile communications allegedly linking the appellant as a “mastermind” was vitiated because these documents were neither supplied to the detenu nor produced before the court.
  • Misuse to Subvert Bail Orders: The Court observed that preventive detention was invoked merely to frustrate the judicial process and keep the appellant in custody despite his acquisition of bail in all regular criminal cases. The state cannot blur the line between punitive and preventive jurisdictions by using ongoing criminal investigation materials to justify detention.
  • Strict Scrutiny on Personal Liberty: Reaffirming principles from Ameena Begum and Vijay Narain Singh, the Court emphasized that preventive detention is an extraordinary measure that departs from ordinary constitutional guarantees of liberty under Article 21 and must be invoked with the utmost circumspection.
  • Relief and Costs: The detention and confirmation orders were quashed, and the appellant was directed to be released forthwith. Additionally, considering the loss of liberty and misuse of the process, the Supreme Court imposed costs of Rs. 10 lakhs on the State to be paid to the appellant within one month.

2026 INSC 1067

Mulla Afroz v. Union of India and Ors. (D.O.J. 29.09.2026)

2026 INSC 1067 click here to view full text of judgment

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Oral Agreements and Barred Suits: Supreme Court Sets Aside Specific Performance Decree

September 30, 2026 No Comments

In this civil appeal, the Supreme Court of India addressed the legality of concurrent decrees granting specific performance based solely on an oral agreement. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside both the Trial Court and High Court judgments. The bench held that the subsequent suit for specific performance was fundamentally not maintainable under the rigours of Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), because the plaintiff had previously filed and withdrawn a suit for permanent injunction without seeking leave of the court to reserve the claim for specific performance. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the plaintiff failed to meet the heavy burden of proof required to establish a concluded oral contract, noting critical inconsistencies in pleadings, lack of proper corporate authorization, and unencashed advance instruments.

  • Maintainability and Order II Rule 2 CPC: The Court emphasized that when a plaintiff files a suit for a lesser relief (such as a permanent injunction) while a broader cause of action for specific performance has already accrued, omitting to claim specific performance or failing to obtain leave of the court at the time of institution bars a subsequent suit under Order II Rule 2. A subsequent withdrawal of the first suit with a general liberty to file afresh does not cure the initial defect of failing to seek leave under Order II Rule 2.
  • Strict Proof for Oral Contracts: Reaffirming precedents like Brij Mohan and Nanjappa, the Court reiterated that while a suit for specific performance can legally be based on an oral agreement, a heavy burden lies on the plaintiff to provide strict proof of a concluded contract where vital and fundamental terms were settled. Mere inferences or evasive/dishonest testimonies from defence witnesses cannot be used to fill gaps in the plaintiff’s case.
  • Discrepancies and Evidence: The record revealed shifting stances across plaints regarding the number of meetings, dates of refusal, and identities of participants. Crucially, a large advance cheque of Rs. 5 crores was never presented to the bank for encashment, indicating that the parties never finalized or acted upon a concluded contract.
  • Inadmissibility of Hearsay and Status: The testimony of high-ranking political figures or independent witnesses cannot substitute for lack of formal pleadings or direct legal authorization. The involvement of a family member (son-in-law) lacking official capacity or authorization from the company board cannot bind a corporate entity under Section 46 of the Companies Act, 1956.
  • Final Outcome: The Supreme Court concluded that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were perverse. The appeal was allowed, and the suit for specific performance was dismissed with parties bearing their own costs.

2026 INSC 1066

Bombay Garage Ahmedabad Limited & Ors. v. JP Iscon Private Ltd. & Anr. (D.O.J. 29.09.2026)

2026 INSC 1066 click here to view full text of judgment

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Unraveling the PHED Scam: SC Grants Regular Bail to Accused Public Servant and Private Intermediary

September 30, 2026 No Comments

In these criminal appeals arising from the dismissal of regular bail applications by the Rajasthan High Court, a bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu considered the cases of two appellants—Shubhanshu Dixit, a former public servant who served as Secretary of the Rajasthan Water Supply and Sewerage Management Board (RWSSMB), and Sanjay Badaya, a private individual alleged to be an intermediary for the former Public Health Engineering Department (PHED) Minister—who were implicated in a massive financial scam involving forged IRCON certificates and tender irregularities. Noting that both appellants had already undergone substantial pre-trial detention ( Dixit arrested on February 17, 2026, and Badaya on May 11, 2026), that co-accused individuals including the principal political executive had already been granted bail or protection, and that continued incarceration would serve no fruitful purpose, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s orders and granted regular bail to both appellants subject to specific terms and conditions.

  • Background and FIR: The prosecution’s case stems from a preliminary enquiry initiated on 18th January 2024, culminating in an FIR registered on 30th October 2024 at the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) Police Station in Jaipur for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and various sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, concerning financial irregularities within the Public Health Engineering Department (PHED), Rajasthan.
  • Role of Shubhanshu Dixit: Appellant Shubhanshu Dixit served as the Secretary of RWSSMB and de facto Secretary of the PHED Finance Committee; he was accused of suppressing whistleblower complaints regarding forged IRCON certificates and participating in meetings that awarded tenders to ineligible firms. He was arrested on 17th February 2026, and his regular bail application was dismissed by the High Court on 1st June 2026.
  • Role of Sanjay Badaya: Appellant Sanjay Badaya, a private individual, was alleged to be a central broker for the then PHED Minister, exercising undue influence over departmental files, transfers, and postings, and routing bribe monies through family bank accounts to a firm owned by the former Minister’s son. He was arrested on 11th May 2026, and his bail application was rejected by the High Court on 13th August 2026.
  • Grounds for Bail: While acknowledging the gravity of deep-rooted economic offences, the Supreme Court emphasized that pre-trial detention cannot be used as a punitive measure, especially when incarceration serves no further purpose.
  • Parity with Co-Accused: The Court was persuaded by the fact that other co-accused persons, such as Mr. Arun Srivastava, had been granted bail by the High Court, and the principal political executive (the former PHED Minister) had already been granted bail in the corresponding PMLA case by the Supreme Court.
  • Directions and Conditions: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s orders and directed that both Sanjay Badaya and Shubhanshu Dixit be released on regular bail upon furnishing satisfactory bail bonds to the Trial Court. The appellants were directed to join the investigation if called upon by the investigating officer, diligently participate in the trial proceedings without default, and avoid any breach of bail conditions.

2026 INSC 1065

Sanjay Badaya v. State of Rajasthan (With Criminal Appeal No. of 2026 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 13461 of 2026 – Shubhanshu Dixit v. State of Rajasthan)(D.O.J. 29.09.2026)

2026 INSC 1065 click here to view full text of judgment

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Safeguarding Women’s Dignity: Supreme Court Intervenes Suo Motu on Systemic Safety Lapses in Delhi-NCR

September 30, 2026 No Comments

Taking suo motu cognizance of alarming media reports detailing brutal crimes against women and minors across Delhi-NCR—including the gang rape and murder of a teenager in Swaroop Nagar and the sexual assault of a minor inside a moving sleeper bus—the Supreme Court bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran expressed deep anguish over systemic law enforcement failures. Highlighting that public safety is an intrinsic facet of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, the Court emphasized that mere expressions of concern by public authorities are insufficient. It mandated a measurable response with fixed institutional accountability, directing comprehensive status reports on existing safety infrastructure, laying down immediate interim measures such as specialized vulnerability mapping and strict enforcement against tinted vehicle windows, and appointing Ms. Liz Mathew, Senior Counsel, as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court.

  • Suo Motu Cognizance & Triggering Incidents: The Supreme Court initiated the suo motu writ petition following horrific incidents in Delhi-NCR, notably the gang rape and murder of a teenage girl in Swaroop Nagar and the sexual assault of a minor in a moving sleeper bus that traversed over 47 kilometers from Greater Noida to Delhi unchecked, drawing painful parallels to the 2012 Nirbhaya case.
  • Violation of Article 21: The Court underscored that the right to live with dignity and free from violence is a core component of Article 21. It ruled that public spaces (such as roads, buses, parks, and subways) cannot be permitted to become high-risk zones due to poor illumination, inadequate surveillance, or administrative laxity.
  • Call for Accountability: Moving beyond symbolic solidarity and expressions of concern, the Court stressed the urgent need for measurable responses, clear institutional responsibility, and proactive crime prevention.
  • Information Sought from Authorities: The Supreme Court directed the Chief Secretary of Delhi and the Commissioner of Police to submit comprehensive status reports within four weeks on critical safety mechanisms, including:
    • The Nirbhaya Fund implementation and women safety umbrella programs.
    • Operational status of emergency response systems, specifically ERSS Number 112 and Women Helpline 181.
    • The Safe City Project (covering CCTV networks, command-and-control centers, smart lighting, and maintenance mechanisms).
    • Functionality and staffing of Women Help Desks across police stations.
    • Operational parameters of Fast Track Special Courts (FTSCs) and Exclusive POCSO Courts.
  • Immediate Interim Measures (Within 4 Weeks):
    • Specialized Police Task Force: Constitution of a dedicated task force by the Delhi Police Commissioner for vulnerability mapping of dark, isolated, and unsafe public stretches.
    • Citizen Feedback Mechanism: Establishment of an accessible, tech-enabled platform for citizens to report non-functional lights, blind spots, or inadequate CCTV coverage with geo-tagging capabilities and trackable action taken reports.
    • Intensified Enforcement: Deployment of mobile check-posts and strict enforcement of the total prohibition on black, tinted, or solar-control window films on vehicles in compliance with Avishek Goenka v. Union of India.
  • Judicial and Administrative Directions: The Delhi High Court Registrar General was ordered to place on record the status, pendency, and disposal rates of FTSCs and Exclusive POCSO Courts, with instructions to assign the subject cases to a designated court for expeditious trial within one year. Furthermore, the media was urged to proactively run pro-bono awareness columns and helpline details, and Ms. Liz Mathew, Senior Counsel, was appointed as Amicus Curiae.
  • Next Date of Hearing: The matter has been posted for further hearing on 5th October 2026.

2026 INSC 1063

In Re: Safety, Security and Protection of Women and Children in Public Spaces (Suo Motu Writ Petition (Criminal)) (D.O.J. 28.09.2026)

2026 INSC 1063 click here to view full text of judgment

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