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Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act: Removal of Mahant – Natural Justice

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In Arjun Dass v. The State of Andhra Pradesh and Others (Civil Appeal No. [To Be Allocated] of 2026, arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 38500 of 2025, decided on May 29, 2026), the Supreme Court of India adjudicated a significant religious and administrative dispute concerning the removal of the Mathadhipathi (Mahant) of the historical Sri Swamy Hathiramji Mutt in Tirupathi under the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (“1987 Act”). The appellant challenged his removal by the Dharmika Parishad (and its subsequent confirmation by the State Government), which was based on an ex-parte enquiry report containing 16 charges of financial mismanagement, nepotism, and customary violations. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh had previously dismissed the appellant’s appeal, affirming his removal.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s judgment along with the removal and confirmation orders, ruling that the entire disciplinary process was severely vitiated by gross violations of the principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem). The Division Bench of Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar found that the 27-page charge memo and 600 pages of supporting documents were never properly served upon the appellant, and his requests for documents and time to prepare his defense were ignored. Furthermore, the Court observed that a pre-decisional resolution passed by the Dharmika Parishad to simultaneously frame charges and suspend the Mahant revealed that the outcome was predetermined.

Invoking its plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to remedy systemic vulnerabilities and structural gaps in the statutory framework, the Supreme Court fashioned a unique, case-specific mechanism. It appointed an independent, one-man enquiry committee led by a retired District Judge to conduct a fresh, fair enquiry within one year. To preserve the institutional integrity of the Mutt’s extensive properties during this transition without severing the unique, legally blended spiritual and temporal components of Mahantship, the Court reinstated the appellant as Mathadhipathi. However, his administrative functions were subjected to the oversight of a newly formed, judicially supervised six-member Administrative Committee.

1. Factual Matrix & Institutional Conflict

  • Rise to Mahantship: The appellant has been associated with the Sri Swamy Hathiramji Mutt since 1970. Starting as a Pujari in 1975, he rose through the ranks to be confirmed as the permanent Mahant by the apex Akhada Panchayat and officially appointed by the Commissioner of Endowments on July 6, 2000.
  • Prior Rounds of State Litigation: Shortly after his appointment, the appellant engaged in litigation to force the Endowments Department to hand over the secular management of the Mutt to him. The department retaliated by suo motu canceling his appointment order in 2003, an action that was subsequently set aside by a Single Judge of the High Court in 2006. Following mandatory government orders, the secular management and vast properties were formally returned to the appellant in late 2006.
  • The 2023 Charges and Physical Seizure: Following temporary suspension cycles between 2018 and 2020 triggered by local newspaper reports, the newly constituted Dharmika Parishad passed a unified resolution on May 09, 2023, authorizing the simultaneous preparation of charges and suspension orders against the appellant. On June 8, 2023, the Parishad simultaneously issued 16 charges, suspended the appellant, and appointed an administrator (“Fit Person”). On the very same day, the Endowments Department physically seized the Mutt office and expelled the appellant from his residence while he was away on a pilgrimage.

2. The Ex-Parte Enquiry Report & Removal

The three-member enquiry committee conducted its entire proceedings ex-parte on a single day, July 19, 2023, after serving a notice to the appellant via WhatsApp just five days prior. The appellant’s advocate had transmitted three separate requests via email and personal delivery seeking a copy of the 600 pages of relied-upon evidence and a one-month extension due to the appellant falling ill with viral fever in Ayodhya. The committee discarded these requests on technical grounds (characterizing them as an “unsigned letter on WhatsApp”) and submitted its report on August 1, 2023, finding all 16 charges proved.

The charges included executing an unauthorized sale agreement of Mutt property, purchasing assets in his personal name, violating monastic customs, delaying employee benefits, and failing to pay statutory department dues. On November 24, 2023, the Dharmika Parishad issued the formal Removal Order, which was confirmed by the State Government via a Government Order (G.O.Ms. No. 581) on December 8, 2023.

3. Legal Analysis & Core Reasoning of the Court

A. Foundations of Procedural Fairness in Religious Offices

The Supreme Court emphasized that the removal of a Mathadhipathi is not a simple administrative exercise. It actively impacts substantive civil rights, specifically the right to hold a religious office and pursue a spiritual vocation. Under Article 14 of the Constitution, the rule of audi alteram partem operates with full force in such quasi-judicial proceedings. Citing Canara Bank v. V. K. Awasthy (2005), the Court reiterated that a precise, unambiguous notice accompanied by the complete evidentiary materials forming the baseline of the accusations is a non-negotiable requirement of fair play. An abstract opportunity to defend oneself without a full disclosure of the evidence is entirely illusory.

B. The Legal Absurdity of Purported Service by Affixation

The state robustly argued that the principles of natural justice were satisfied because the 27-page charge memo had been served via email and by affixing it to the door of the Mahant’s residence under a Panchanama on June 9, 2023. The Supreme Court completely rejected this defense, exposing a structural contradiction:

  • The state’s own photographic records proved that the Endowments Department had already physically seized the entire Mutt premises and locked out the appellant on June 8, 2023.
  • The Court noted that for the state to dispossess an individual from his residence, assume total physical control of the doors, and then claim valid legal service by pasting notices on those very doors is a “legal absurdity”. Once an individual is locked out by the state, the legal fiction of constructive notice collapses because they no longer have physical access to see the door. Furthermore, the records showed that only the 6-page “Fit Person” appointment order was pasted, while the 600 pages of supporting documents were completely omitted.

[ THE STRUCTURAL BREACH OF SERVIC

The respondents argued that any procedural gaps in the initial enquiry were cured because the appellant was later given a chance to submit detailed written explanations to a final show-cause notice on November 3, 2023, and was granted a personal hearing with his lawyers on November 16, 2023.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument, clarifying that an opportunity afforded on the back of a fundamentally tainted, ex-parte enquiry report—compiled without supplying the relied-upon documents—cannot substitute for a valid statutory enquiry under Section 51(2) of the 1987 Act. A fair hearing at a later stage cannot breath legal life into a process that was structurally compromised and predetermined from its inception.

D. Piercing the Procedural Vacuum via Article 142

The ordinary course of action following the quashing of a removal order would be to remand the matter back to the statutory body (Dharmika Parishad) for a de novo enquiry. However, the Supreme Court determined that a simple remand would leave the appellant’s civil and religious rights unprotected due to severe structural impediments:

  1. The Institutional Taint: The Dharmika Parishad is composed entirely of state nominees and ex-officio government functionaries. The officials who would sit on a reconstituted board are the very individuals whose prior hostile conduct and rushed, ex-parte procedures created the initial legal infirmities. REMANDING the dispute to them would re-create the exact conditions of bias.
  2. The Procedural Vacuum: Section 51(2) authorizes the Parishad to frame charges but leaves a complete statutory vacuum regarding the execution of an independent, neutral enquiry. The state had filled this gap by misapplying Rule 26 of the 2009 Rules—designed purely for internal administrative committees—to create a disciplinary body. This effectively allowed the adjudicating authority to act as investigator, prosecutor, and judge.
  3. The Concept of Mahantship: Relying on the landmark constitutional authority in The Commissioner, H.R.E. Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954), the Court reiterated that in the legal concept of Mahantship, the elements of religious office and property administration are seamlessly blended and cannot be detached. Keeping the Mutt under the indefinite control of a state-appointed “Fit Person” while a lawful Mahant is active violates Article 26 of the Constitution.

4. Final Decretal Directions & Interim Regime

Invoking its plenary and supplementary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice, fill procedural vacuums, and ensure a completely fair, unbiased resolution, the Supreme Court ordered a case-specific interim regime:

A. Setting Aside of Impugned Actions

The High Court’s judgment dated May 09, 2025, the Dharmika Parishad’s Removal Order dated November 24, 2023, the government’s confirmation order (G.O.Ms. No. 581), and the original 2023 enquiry report are all set aside.

B. Appointment of a One-Man Independent Enquiry Committee

  • The Arbitrator: Boddepalli Rama Rao, a retired District Judge, is appointed as a one-man independent enquiry committee to review the 16 charges afresh.
  • Procedural Protections: The Principal District Judge at Chittoor must provide a neutral venue within the Tirupati Court Complex and depute two court staff to assist the committee.
  • The Timeline: The state must hand over all 600 pages of supporting materials to the committee within two weeks, which will then immediately supply them to the appellant. The appellant will have a minimum of four weeks to submit his statement of defense. The committee must afford full opportunities for the cross-examination of witnesses and submit its final report to the Endowments Department within one year.

C. Reinstatement and the Six-Member Administrative Committee

The appellant is immediately restored to his office and legal status as the Mathadhipathi of the Mutt, enabling him to conduct all core religious and spiritual activities. However, to guarantee absolute transparency over the Mutt’s extensive, vulnerable estates during the pending enquiry, the Court constituted a six-member Administrative Committee to assist and oversee secular functions under Section 55(2)(b) of the Act:

Position Committee Member Professional Background / Profile
Chairman Hon’ble Mr. Justice (Retd.) Duppala Venkata Ramana Retired Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh / Madhya Pradesh.
Member Swami Madhav Prapanna Charya Eminent religious representative affiliated with Ramanuj Kot, Ujjain; expert in Vaishnava Sampradaya and monastic customs.
Member Mr. Manish Kapooria Retired Indian Police Service (IPS) Officer (Madhya Pradesh Cadre).
Member Mr. Y.V. Raviprasad Senior Advocate, Andhra Pradesh.
Member Mr. Manish Taskar Professional Chartered Accountant based in Hyderabad.
Member State Nominee An official nominated by the Andhra Pradesh Endowment Department within one week.

D. The Administrative Committee’s Mandate

  • The committee shall act strictly in a supervisory and facilitative capacity, without displacing the appellant’s spiritual authority.
  • It must prepare a comprehensive asset inventory of all movable and immovable Mutt properties within three months.
  • It must protect Mutt lands from encroachment and track all active litigations.
  • Strict Restraint: No asset alienation, leasing, mortgaging, or creation of third-party rights over Mutt properties shall take place without the prior, written permission of the Administrative Committee.
  • All expenses and a sitting fee (₹25,000 for the Chairman; ₹10,000 for members) shall be defrayed directly from the Mutt’s internal funds, and the committee must endeavor to meet at the head office at least once every three months.

E. Finality of the Interim Regime

This arrangement serves as an interim regime operational only until the Endowment Department passes its final order based on the independent retired judge’s report[cite: 20]. If the final report is adverse and results in a new removal order, the appellant retains the liberty to file a statutory appeal within one month[cite: 20]. Given its highly unique facts, this order shall not be treated as a legal precedent to supplant the statutory authority of the Dharmika Parishad in other cases[cite: 20].

2026 INSC 592

Arjun Dass  V. State of Andhra Pradesh And Others (D.O.J. 29.05.2026)

2026 INSC 592 click here to view full text of judgment

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Admissibility of Deceased Witness Testimony Against Absconding Accused

July 18, 2026 No Comments

Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the State of West Bengal, ruling that the deposition of a deceased witness recorded in an earlier trial is admissible in a subsequent trial against an absconding accused, provided the requirements of Section 299 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) are met. The Court clarified that the provision serves to preserve evidence when an accused deliberately absconds, preventing them from benefiting from the unavailability of material witnesses due to the passage of time. The Court set aside the High Court’s order, which had denied the admission of the victim’s testimony, confirming that the statutory preconditions—the accused absconding and no immediate prospect of arrest—were satisfied at the time the witness deposed.

  • Background: In a 2012 gang-rape case, the respondent and another accused were absconding while three others were tried and convicted. The victim, a key witness, testified in the first trial but passed away in 2015. After the respondent was arrested in 2016, the prosecution sought to admit the victim’s earlier deposition as evidence under Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act read with Section 299 of the CrPC.
  • High Court Order: The High Court of Calcutta had rejected the application, observing that the prosecution had a duty to obtain a specific direction from the Trial Court to record evidence against the absconder during the first trial, and thus the earlier deposition could not be used against the respondent.
  • Interpretation of Section 299 CrPC: The Supreme Court held that Section 299 CrPC acts as an exception to the general rule requiring a witness to be examined in the presence of the accused. It does not mandate a formal, prior order from a Magistrate to record that the accused is absconding; rather, what is relevant is whether the conditions—that the accused is absconding and there is no immediate prospect of arrest—were established at the time the evidence was recorded.
  • Preventing Misuse of Process: The Court reasoned that taking a restrictive view of Section 299 would jeopardize the criminal justice system by incentivizing accused persons to wilfully abscond and await the death or unavailability of material witnesses.
  • Application to Facts: The Court noted that the respondent was a declared absconder when the victim’s testimony was recorded (2013), and he remained at large until his arrest in 2016. As the two essential conditions of Section 299(1) were met, the deceased victim’s evidence is admissible in the trial against the respondent.

Legislative Continuity: The Court noted that the legislature has maintained this principle in Section 335 of the recently enacted Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, reinforcing the intent to ensure evidence is preserved against those who evade trial.

2026 INSC 718

The State of West Bengal v. Kader Khan – (D.O.J. 17.07.2026)

2026 INSC 718 click here to view full text of judgment

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Insolvency and Bankruptcy: Finality of Resolution Plans and Extinguishment of Sub-judice Claims

July 18, 2026 No Comments

Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the Successful Resolution Applicant (Appellant-SRA), ruling that upon the approval of a Resolution Plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), all claims—including those pending adjudication (sub-judice)—that are not specifically provided for in the plan stand extinguished. The Court held that the “clean slate” doctrine is fundamental to the IBC, preventing unresolved or contingent claims from resurfacing and undermining the revival of the corporate debtor. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court orders and dismissed the civil suit and arbitration proceedings initiated by operational creditors, affirming that they are bound by the terms of the approved Resolution Plan.

  • Background: The Appellant-SRA challenged Bombay High Court orders that allowed a civil recovery suit and arbitration proceedings to continue against the corporate debtor (Bhushan Steel Limited) despite the approval of its Resolution Plan. The respondents, operational creditors, sought to pursue claims that were pending at the time of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP).
  • Treatment of Claims: During the CIRP, the Resolution Professional admitted the respondents’ disputed claims at a notional value of Rupee One (1) each. The approved Resolution Plan stipulated that because the liquidation value was NIL, no amounts were due to operational creditors; however, a settlement fund was provided for those with admitted claims.
  • The “Clean Slate” Doctrine: The Court emphasized that a successful resolution applicant must start on a “clean slate,” free from “hydra-headed” surprise claims. Once a Resolution Plan is approved under Section 31(1) of the IBC, it becomes binding on all stakeholders, and claims not incorporated therein are deemed extinguished, withdrawn, or abated.
  • Finality of the Plan: The Court noted that the Final List of Creditors attained finality, and the respondents could not seek to reopen or question the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors after the plan’s approval. The Court found no merit in the allegations of fraud, noting that no proceedings had been initiated under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules to challenge the plan’s integrity.
  • No Express Carve-out: Upon a harmonious reading of the Resolution Plan, the Court concluded there was no express “carve-out” protecting sub-judice claims from extinguishment. The plan explicitly mandated that all legal proceedings relating to the period prior to the effective date stand extinguished, except to the extent of the specific settlement amount provided.
  • Observation on MSMEs: In an “Afterword,” the Court observed that the current insolvency framework does not adequately account for the position of small operational creditors and MSMEs, who are often placed at the bottom of the repayment waterfall. The Court suggested that the Legislature and Law Commission examine this to ensure a more balanced repayment mechanism.
  • Outcome: The Court allowed the appeals, set aside the contrary High Court orders, and dismissed the pending civil suit and arbitration proceedings, enforcing the finality of the Resolution Plan.

2026 INSC 717

M/S Tata Steel Ltd. v. Varsha & Anr. (D.O.J. 17.07.2026)

2026 INSC 717 click here to view full text of judgment

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Excluding Nominated Members from Local Authority Elections

July 18, 2026 No Comments

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court of Karnataka’s decision to exclude nominated members of Town Panchayats from participating in Legislative Council elections for Local Authorities’ Constituencies. The Court ruled that under the constitutional framework established by the 74th Amendment (Part IX-A), nominated members, who serve only in an advisory capacity, lack the democratic mandate of elected representatives. Consequently, their inclusion in the electoral roll was declared unconstitutional, and the Court affirmed the direction to conduct a recount of votes after segregating the invalid votes cast by these nominated members.

  • Background: The election to the Karnataka Legislative Council (Chikkamagaluru Local Authorities Constituency) was challenged because 12 nominated members from four Town Panchayats were included in the electoral roll and participated in the voting. The appellant, who won by a narrow margin of 6 votes, contended that the electoral roll’s finality should be respected.
  • Constitutional Interpretation: The Court held that while Article 171(3)(a) mentions “members” of local authorities, this must be interpreted through the lens of the 74th Constitutional Amendment. Article 243-R establishes that while nominated members may be appointed for their expertise, they are expressly barred from voting in municipal meetings, underscoring their advisory rather than representative role.
  • Democratic Representation: The Supreme Court emphasized that allowing nominated members to vote in Legislative Council elections would undermine the democratic nature of the electoral process, as they are not democratically elected. The Court affirmed that “members” in the context of electoral colleges refers to democratically elected representatives.
  • Finality of Electoral Rolls: While acknowledging the principle that electoral rolls typically attain finality, the Court distinguished this case by noting that the inclusion of the nominated members was void ab initio and unconstitutional. Therefore, the finality of the roll could not be used to validate an illegality that strikes at the core of the electoral college’s composition.
  • Secrecy of the Ballot: The Court rejected the argument that segregating these votes would violate the secrecy of the ballot. It maintained that the higher constitutional goal of preserving free and fair elections and ensuring the purity of the electoral process outweighs the requirement for absolute secrecy in this specific context.
  • Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the High Court’s orders. The Court directed the authorities to proceed with the consequential actions based on the recount results already obtained, ensuring that the election outcome reflects only the valid votes cast by elected representatives.

2026 INSC 716

Pranesh M.K. v. Shanthegowda & Ors. – (D.O.J. 16.07.2026)

2026 INSC 716 click here to view full text of judgment

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Railway: Establishing Liability in Untoward Railway Incidents

July 18, 2026 No Comments

The Supreme Court set aside the concurrent dismissal of a compensation claim by the Railway Claims Tribunal and the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The Court held that when a passenger dies in an “untoward incident” (falling from a running train), the absence of a recovered ticket does not automatically negate the status of a bona fide passenger. Emphasizing the “no-fault liability” principle under Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989, the Court ruled that once the claimant establishes the foundational facts through an affidavit, the burden shifts to the Railways. Technical lapses and the inability to recover personal belongings should not defeat the humanitarian and welfare objectives of the legislation.

  • Background: The appellant filed a claim for compensation following the death of her husband, who fell from a running train while traveling from Raipur to Ahmedabad. The Railway Claims Tribunal and the High Court previously rejected the claim, citing a lack of proof regarding the deceased being a bona fide passenger (specifically due to the missing ticket).
  • Legal Principle (No-Fault Liability): The Court reiterated that Section 124A of the 1989 Act is a beneficial, “no-fault” provision. It is designed to provide expeditious relief to victims of untoward incidents without requiring proof of negligence by the Railway Administration.
  • Burden of Proof: Relying on Union of India v. Rina Devi and Doli Rani Saha v. Union of India, the Court clarified that:
    • The mere absence of a ticket does not disprove that a person was a bona fide
    • The initial burden is on the claimant, which is sufficiently discharged by filing an affidavit stating the facts.
    • Once this is done, the burden shifts to the Railways to disprove the claim based on attending circumstances.
  • Operational Concerns: The Court highlighted the critical issue of chronic overcrowding in Indian Railways. It noted that while the Railway Manuals contain detailed safety and ticketing protocols, the execution often fails. The Court suggested that Railways should increase manpower to better manage safety and ticketing, which could simultaneously reduce such tragedies and provide employment.
  • Constitutional Perspective: The Court observed that using terms like “second class passenger” is outdated and potentially offensive to the spirit of the Constitution of India; it suggested that class designations should refer to the “coach” rather than the “passenger.”

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the lower court judgments. It ordered the Railways to pay compensation of ₹8,00,000 to the appellant within four weeks, failing which the amount would attract interest at 8% from the date of the original claim filing.

2026 INSC 715

Lata v. Union of India & Anr. – (D.O.J. 17.07.2026)

2026 INSC 715 click here to view full text of judgment

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