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Doctrine of forum non conveniens: Error in application of Doctrine

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In Baksish Ahmad v. Union of India &Anr. [Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 630, decided on June 9, 2026], the Supreme Court of India adjudicated a significant constitutional controversy regarding the applicability of the doctrine of forum non conveniens within high court writ jurisdictions under Article 226 of the Constitution. The appellant, an enrolled member of the Border Security Force (BSF), was dismissed from service without pensionary benefits after an internal inquiry found he had contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage without official permission. Although the cause of action physically arose in West Bengal and Jammu & Kashmir, the appellant challenged his dismissal before the Delhi High Court because the headquarters of the BSF and the Ministry of Home Affairs are located in New Delhi. The Delhi High Court declined to entertain his writ petition, invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens on the ground that it was not the appropriate or convenient forum.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s order, and revived the writ petition for a trial on its merits. A Division Bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma held that the Delhi High Court erred in misapplying the doctrine of forum non conveniens to deny the appellant access to a constitutional remedy. The Apex Court ruled that under Article 226(1) of the Constitution, a high court possesses valid territorial jurisdiction if the seat of the authority against whom a writ is sought is situated within its boundaries, irrespective of where the cause of action arose. The Court established that when a litigant files a writ petition at the situs of the respondents’ central headquarters, the doctrine of forum non conveniens rarely applies because the relevant administrative records are legally accessible there, and non-suiting a petitioner under these circumstances frustrates access to justice.

1. Factual Matrix and Trajectory of Litigation

  • The Disciplinary Offense: The appellant was enrolled in the BSF on December 31, 2010, and was serving in the 44th Battalion at Narayanpur, Malda, West Bengal. In April 2022, following a missing person report and a complaint from the appellant’s first wife, a Staff Court of Inquiry (SCOI) was ordered. The SCOI discovered that on May 6, 2022, the appellant had contracted and registered a second marriage in Kushinagar, Uttar Pradesh, during the active subsistence of his first marriage, without obtaining a legal divorce or securing the mandatory prior permission required under Rule 71 of the BSF Rules, 1969, and Rule 21 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
  • The Dismissal Order: On September 19, 2022, the BSF served a show-cause notice upon the appellant. After he failed to submit an explanation within the stipulated fifteen days, the Commandant of the 44th Battalion issued an order on October 27, 2022, dismissing him from service without pensionary benefits. Both the notice and the final dismissal order were served to the appellant at Malda, West Bengal.
  • Statutory Appeal and Writ Filing: The appellant preferred a statutory petition under Rule 28A of the BSF Rules, which was considered and rejected on its merits by the Inspector General, Frontier Headquarters, BSF, Jammu, on December 22, 2023. The appellant then invoked the writ jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court under Article 226 to challenge his dismissal and the rejection of his appeal.

2. High Court Dismissal and Legal Contentions

The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition via a brief order. It held that simply because the offices of the Director General of the BSF and the Ministry of Home Affairs were situated in New Delhi, the court was not turned into the forum conveniens. The High Court observed that because the entire cause of action arose either in West Bengal (dismissal site) or Jammu & Kashmir (appellate rejection site), it was a fit case to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens to refuse discretionary jurisdiction.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant argued that the command and overall administration of the BSF vest in the Director General, whose office is in Delhi, making the Delhi High Court competent to hear the matter under Article 226(1). The respondents, represented by the Additional Solicitor General, counter-argued that no part of the structural cause of action occurred in Delhi, and under the rule established in Arif Azim Co. Ltd. (2024), courts retain high discretion to relegate litigants to alternative, more appropriate geographical fora.

3. Legal Analysis &Ratio Decidendi of the Court

The Supreme Court systematically evaluated the constitutional layout of Article 226, resolving prior internal benchmark conflicts to establish the following principles:

A. The Distinct Ambience of Article 226(1) and 226(2)

The Court clarified that Article 21 and Article 226 of the Constitution establish separate and independent parameters for territorial jurisdiction:

  • Article 226(1) [Situs of Authority]: Confers absolute competence upon a high court based on the physical location or seat of the person, government, or authority against whom relief is sought.
  • Article 226(2) [Cause of Action]: Empowers a high court to issue writs if the cause of action arises, wholly or in part, within its boundaries, even if the seat of the authority is located elsewhere.

The Bench held that because the Union of India and the Director General of the BSF are necessary parties to any enforcement action quashing a Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) dismissal, their location in New Delhi gives the Delhi High Court absolute jurisdiction under Article 226(1).

B. Reconciling Precedents and CAPF Rights

The Court analyzed the tension between its prior rulings in Abrar Ali v. CISF (2012) (which upheld Delhi’s jurisdiction based on headquarters location) and Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Kalyan Banerjee (2008) (which held that a head office location alone does not confer jurisdiction if it had nothing to do with the punishment).

The Court reconciled this by establishing a definitive rule for the armed and paramilitary forces: If a member of a CAPF (including the BSF) is aggrieved by an administrative order of termination, the Delhi High Court always possesses territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(1) due to the central location of the Union of India and the BSF Director General, who holds absolute statutory supervision and command over the force.

C. Misapplication of Forum Non Conveniens in Writ Jurisdictions

The Court delivered a crucial precedent on the limits of forum non conveniens:

  • The doctrine means “an inconvenient forum” and allows a court with valid jurisdiction to decline a case if a more appropriate alternative forum exists.
  • However, the Supreme Court ruled that this doctrine has been misapplied in regular writ proceedings involving Article 226(1).
  • When a citizen files a writ of Certiorari to quash a disciplinary order, the court must issue a Rule Nisi requiring the original case records to be presented for review. Because these official records are legally maintained or accessible within the primary headquarters of the respondents, a suitor who files a case at the respondents’ headquarters has chosen a forum that is highly convenient to the state. Using forum non conveniens to turn away a litigant under these circumstances is self-defeating and denies access to justice.

4. Decretal Directions & Final Order

  • Appeal Allowed: The Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 855-856 of 2026 is allowed, and the impugned orders of the Delhi High Court are set aside[cite: 17].
  • Writ Petition Revived: The appellant’s Writ Petition (C) No. 229 of 2025 is formally revived and restored to the active file of the Delhi High Court for a prompt determination on its structural merits[cite: 17].
  • Review Petition Application: The appeal against the dismissal of the review petition is dismissed as not maintainable under the law[cite: 17].
  • Filing Timelines: To facilitate an early disposal, the respondents are granted a strict timeline of two months to file their comprehensive counter-affidavit before the High Court, and the appellant is granted one month thereafter to submit a rejoinder[cite: 17]. All connected applications stand disposed of[cite: 17].

2026 INSC 630

Baksish Ahmad V. Union Of India &Anr. (09.06.2026)

2026 INSC 630 click here to view full text of judgment

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Admissibility of Deceased Witness Testimony Against Absconding Accused

July 18, 2026 No Comments

Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the State of West Bengal, ruling that the deposition of a deceased witness recorded in an earlier trial is admissible in a subsequent trial against an absconding accused, provided the requirements of Section 299 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) are met. The Court clarified that the provision serves to preserve evidence when an accused deliberately absconds, preventing them from benefiting from the unavailability of material witnesses due to the passage of time. The Court set aside the High Court’s order, which had denied the admission of the victim’s testimony, confirming that the statutory preconditions—the accused absconding and no immediate prospect of arrest—were satisfied at the time the witness deposed.

  • Background: In a 2012 gang-rape case, the respondent and another accused were absconding while three others were tried and convicted. The victim, a key witness, testified in the first trial but passed away in 2015. After the respondent was arrested in 2016, the prosecution sought to admit the victim’s earlier deposition as evidence under Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act read with Section 299 of the CrPC.
  • High Court Order: The High Court of Calcutta had rejected the application, observing that the prosecution had a duty to obtain a specific direction from the Trial Court to record evidence against the absconder during the first trial, and thus the earlier deposition could not be used against the respondent.
  • Interpretation of Section 299 CrPC: The Supreme Court held that Section 299 CrPC acts as an exception to the general rule requiring a witness to be examined in the presence of the accused. It does not mandate a formal, prior order from a Magistrate to record that the accused is absconding; rather, what is relevant is whether the conditions—that the accused is absconding and there is no immediate prospect of arrest—were established at the time the evidence was recorded.
  • Preventing Misuse of Process: The Court reasoned that taking a restrictive view of Section 299 would jeopardize the criminal justice system by incentivizing accused persons to wilfully abscond and await the death or unavailability of material witnesses.
  • Application to Facts: The Court noted that the respondent was a declared absconder when the victim’s testimony was recorded (2013), and he remained at large until his arrest in 2016. As the two essential conditions of Section 299(1) were met, the deceased victim’s evidence is admissible in the trial against the respondent.

Legislative Continuity: The Court noted that the legislature has maintained this principle in Section 335 of the recently enacted Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, reinforcing the intent to ensure evidence is preserved against those who evade trial.

2026 INSC 718

The State of West Bengal v. Kader Khan – (D.O.J. 17.07.2026)

2026 INSC 718 click here to view full text of judgment

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Insolvency and Bankruptcy: Finality of Resolution Plans and Extinguishment of Sub-judice Claims

July 18, 2026 No Comments

Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the Successful Resolution Applicant (Appellant-SRA), ruling that upon the approval of a Resolution Plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), all claims—including those pending adjudication (sub-judice)—that are not specifically provided for in the plan stand extinguished. The Court held that the “clean slate” doctrine is fundamental to the IBC, preventing unresolved or contingent claims from resurfacing and undermining the revival of the corporate debtor. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court orders and dismissed the civil suit and arbitration proceedings initiated by operational creditors, affirming that they are bound by the terms of the approved Resolution Plan.

  • Background: The Appellant-SRA challenged Bombay High Court orders that allowed a civil recovery suit and arbitration proceedings to continue against the corporate debtor (Bhushan Steel Limited) despite the approval of its Resolution Plan. The respondents, operational creditors, sought to pursue claims that were pending at the time of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP).
  • Treatment of Claims: During the CIRP, the Resolution Professional admitted the respondents’ disputed claims at a notional value of Rupee One (1) each. The approved Resolution Plan stipulated that because the liquidation value was NIL, no amounts were due to operational creditors; however, a settlement fund was provided for those with admitted claims.
  • The “Clean Slate” Doctrine: The Court emphasized that a successful resolution applicant must start on a “clean slate,” free from “hydra-headed” surprise claims. Once a Resolution Plan is approved under Section 31(1) of the IBC, it becomes binding on all stakeholders, and claims not incorporated therein are deemed extinguished, withdrawn, or abated.
  • Finality of the Plan: The Court noted that the Final List of Creditors attained finality, and the respondents could not seek to reopen or question the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors after the plan’s approval. The Court found no merit in the allegations of fraud, noting that no proceedings had been initiated under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules to challenge the plan’s integrity.
  • No Express Carve-out: Upon a harmonious reading of the Resolution Plan, the Court concluded there was no express “carve-out” protecting sub-judice claims from extinguishment. The plan explicitly mandated that all legal proceedings relating to the period prior to the effective date stand extinguished, except to the extent of the specific settlement amount provided.
  • Observation on MSMEs: In an “Afterword,” the Court observed that the current insolvency framework does not adequately account for the position of small operational creditors and MSMEs, who are often placed at the bottom of the repayment waterfall. The Court suggested that the Legislature and Law Commission examine this to ensure a more balanced repayment mechanism.
  • Outcome: The Court allowed the appeals, set aside the contrary High Court orders, and dismissed the pending civil suit and arbitration proceedings, enforcing the finality of the Resolution Plan.

2026 INSC 717

M/S Tata Steel Ltd. v. Varsha & Anr. (D.O.J. 17.07.2026)

2026 INSC 717 click here to view full text of judgment

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Excluding Nominated Members from Local Authority Elections

July 18, 2026 No Comments

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court of Karnataka’s decision to exclude nominated members of Town Panchayats from participating in Legislative Council elections for Local Authorities’ Constituencies. The Court ruled that under the constitutional framework established by the 74th Amendment (Part IX-A), nominated members, who serve only in an advisory capacity, lack the democratic mandate of elected representatives. Consequently, their inclusion in the electoral roll was declared unconstitutional, and the Court affirmed the direction to conduct a recount of votes after segregating the invalid votes cast by these nominated members.

  • Background: The election to the Karnataka Legislative Council (Chikkamagaluru Local Authorities Constituency) was challenged because 12 nominated members from four Town Panchayats were included in the electoral roll and participated in the voting. The appellant, who won by a narrow margin of 6 votes, contended that the electoral roll’s finality should be respected.
  • Constitutional Interpretation: The Court held that while Article 171(3)(a) mentions “members” of local authorities, this must be interpreted through the lens of the 74th Constitutional Amendment. Article 243-R establishes that while nominated members may be appointed for their expertise, they are expressly barred from voting in municipal meetings, underscoring their advisory rather than representative role.
  • Democratic Representation: The Supreme Court emphasized that allowing nominated members to vote in Legislative Council elections would undermine the democratic nature of the electoral process, as they are not democratically elected. The Court affirmed that “members” in the context of electoral colleges refers to democratically elected representatives.
  • Finality of Electoral Rolls: While acknowledging the principle that electoral rolls typically attain finality, the Court distinguished this case by noting that the inclusion of the nominated members was void ab initio and unconstitutional. Therefore, the finality of the roll could not be used to validate an illegality that strikes at the core of the electoral college’s composition.
  • Secrecy of the Ballot: The Court rejected the argument that segregating these votes would violate the secrecy of the ballot. It maintained that the higher constitutional goal of preserving free and fair elections and ensuring the purity of the electoral process outweighs the requirement for absolute secrecy in this specific context.
  • Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the High Court’s orders. The Court directed the authorities to proceed with the consequential actions based on the recount results already obtained, ensuring that the election outcome reflects only the valid votes cast by elected representatives.

2026 INSC 716

Pranesh M.K. v. Shanthegowda & Ors. – (D.O.J. 16.07.2026)

2026 INSC 716 click here to view full text of judgment

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Railway: Establishing Liability in Untoward Railway Incidents

July 18, 2026 No Comments

The Supreme Court set aside the concurrent dismissal of a compensation claim by the Railway Claims Tribunal and the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The Court held that when a passenger dies in an “untoward incident” (falling from a running train), the absence of a recovered ticket does not automatically negate the status of a bona fide passenger. Emphasizing the “no-fault liability” principle under Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989, the Court ruled that once the claimant establishes the foundational facts through an affidavit, the burden shifts to the Railways. Technical lapses and the inability to recover personal belongings should not defeat the humanitarian and welfare objectives of the legislation.

  • Background: The appellant filed a claim for compensation following the death of her husband, who fell from a running train while traveling from Raipur to Ahmedabad. The Railway Claims Tribunal and the High Court previously rejected the claim, citing a lack of proof regarding the deceased being a bona fide passenger (specifically due to the missing ticket).
  • Legal Principle (No-Fault Liability): The Court reiterated that Section 124A of the 1989 Act is a beneficial, “no-fault” provision. It is designed to provide expeditious relief to victims of untoward incidents without requiring proof of negligence by the Railway Administration.
  • Burden of Proof: Relying on Union of India v. Rina Devi and Doli Rani Saha v. Union of India, the Court clarified that:
    • The mere absence of a ticket does not disprove that a person was a bona fide
    • The initial burden is on the claimant, which is sufficiently discharged by filing an affidavit stating the facts.
    • Once this is done, the burden shifts to the Railways to disprove the claim based on attending circumstances.
  • Operational Concerns: The Court highlighted the critical issue of chronic overcrowding in Indian Railways. It noted that while the Railway Manuals contain detailed safety and ticketing protocols, the execution often fails. The Court suggested that Railways should increase manpower to better manage safety and ticketing, which could simultaneously reduce such tragedies and provide employment.
  • Constitutional Perspective: The Court observed that using terms like “second class passenger” is outdated and potentially offensive to the spirit of the Constitution of India; it suggested that class designations should refer to the “coach” rather than the “passenger.”

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the lower court judgments. It ordered the Railways to pay compensation of ₹8,00,000 to the appellant within four weeks, failing which the amount would attract interest at 8% from the date of the original claim filing.

2026 INSC 715

Lata v. Union of India & Anr. – (D.O.J. 17.07.2026)

2026 INSC 715 click here to view full text of judgment

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