Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

DNA Test: Paternity – When to allow

In Chaturbhuj Pradhan v. Amar Pradhan & Another (Civil Appeal No. [To Be Allocated] of 2026, arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 4016 of 2026, decided on May 29, 2026), the Supreme Court of India adjudicated a vital family law dispute concerning the constitutional boundaries of compelling an individual to undergo a DNA paternity test. The appellant challenged concurrent orders passed by a Chhattisgarh Civil Court and the High Court of Chhattisgarh, which directed him to submit DNA samples to resolve a paternity suit filed by the first respondent. The first respondent sought a declaration of paternity and a corresponding 1/3 share in the appellant’s property.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the lower courts’ directives, ruling that a DNA test was indispensable to resolve the controversy. A Division Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh clarified that while DNA profiling should not be routinely ordered, it is entirely permissible in exceptional cases where paternity is directly in issue and no other conclusive evidence exists. In balancing the appellant’s right to privacy with the respondent’s legitimate interest in discovering his biological lineage, the Court held that equity tilted heavily in favor of the son, who faced lifelong social and financial exclusion due to the persistent denial of his paternity.

1. Factual Matrix & Background Litigation

  • The Originating Claim: The first respondent, Amar Pradhan, is the son of the second respondent. Amar asserted that he was born on September 10, 1999, as a direct result of consensual relations between his mother and the appellant, Chaturbhuj Pradhan (CP), in January 1999.
  • The Appellant’s Denial: CP consistently denied these assertions, heavily relying on his acquittal in a historic criminal case registered against him by the mother under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. Between 2003 and 2010, the parties engaged in multiple rounds of summary maintenance litigation. Notably, in a 2005 criminal miscellaneous case, the High Court observed that the mother and son had failed to establish a relationship with CP. This maintenance dispute eventually traveled to the Supreme Court’s Lok Adalat, where it was disposed of in 2024 with the observation that since Amar had turned 24 years old, nothing survived in the summary matter.
  • The Civil Suit: Upon reaching majority and during the pendency of the historic maintenance appeal, Amar instituted a regular civil declaration suit before the First Additional Civil Judge, Class-II, Basna. He sought a formal declaration that he is the biological son of CP and requested a decree for a $1/3^{\text{rd}}$ share in CP’s ancestral property. To resolve the impasse, the Civil Court ordered CP to undergo a DNA test on September 21, 2019. The High Court of Chhattisgarh subsequently dismissed CP’s writ petition on June 16, 2025, noting that no other form of evidence could conclusively settle the biological dispute.

2. Core Legal Issues Formulated

The Supreme Court structured the competing claims around three primary constitutional and procedural inquiries:

  1. Under what exceptional parameters can a civil court compel an individual to undergo a invasive medical test like DNA profiling?
  2. How should courts balance an adult’s right to privacy against a child’s legitimate interest in knowing their biological father?
  3. Whether summary findings recorded in historical maintenance proceedings under Section 125 of the CrPC operate as res judicata to bar a subsequent civil title suit.

3. Submissions of the Parties

A. Arguments Appended by the Appellant (CP)

  • Invasiveness & Lack of Need: CP contended that he could not be forcefully compelled to surrender bodily samples for analysis, and there was no imminent or indispensable need for a DNA test at this stage of the suit.
  • Procedural Bars: He argued that the suit was completely barred by the doctrine of res judicata given the prior judicial observations in the 2005 maintenance litigation. He further claimed that no adverse inference could be legally drawn against him under Section 114(h) of the Indian Evidence Act for refusing to give a sample.

B. Arguments Appended by the Respondents (Amar & Mother)

  • Absence of Other Recourse: Amar’s counsel counter-argued that in light of CP’s continuous and absolute denial of paternity, a scientific DNA test was the only definitive mechanism available to establish the truth.
  • Privacy Is Not Absolute: The defense emphasized that the constitutional right to privacy is not absolute and must give way to the demands of justice. Because Amar was not born during the subsistence of a valid marriage, the statutory presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act did not apply, leaving a vacuum that only science could fill. Furthermore, res judicata was inapplicable because Section 125 proceedings are summary, peripheral, and do not amount to final civil title determinations.

4. Statutory Analysis & Core Reasoning of the Court

The Supreme Court systematically evaluated its historic jurisprudence on genetic testing, tracing the development of the law through several landmark cases:

A. The Evolution of DNA Testing Jurisprudence

  • Goutam Kundu (1993): Established the baseline protection that courts cannot order blood tests routinely or to facilitate “roving inquiries,” and recognized that no one can be physically compelled to give a sample.
  • Dipanwita Roy (2015): Clarified that a DNA examination is permissible when it strikes at the very root of the allegations upon which a party’s case succeeds or fails, though it should be avoided if alternate modes of proof exist.
  • Aparna Ajinkya Firodia (2024): Culled out strict criteria, ruling that genetic profiling can be directed only in exceptional, deserving cases where the test is “indispensable” to resolve a controversy directly in issue.
  • Ivan Rathinam (2025): Introduced the two-pronged blockade test, mandating that an order for DNA profiling requires a positive finding on two distinct counts: (i) insufficiency of alternate evidence, and (ii) a positive finding regarding the balance of interests.

B. Paternity Directly in Issue

Applying these tests, the Court noted that the question of Amar’s paternity was not a collateral or peripheral matter; it was the primary, direct issue upon which the entire declaration suit depended. Because the mother’s relationship with CP occurred in January 1999 and the child was born in September 1999—and since there were no allegations that the mother had an intimate relationship with anyone else—the medical test was the only definitive recourse available to arrive at the truth. The Court also held that historical maintenance findings were recorded in a summary format and did not emerge from a full-dress civil trial, meaning the plea of res judicata was legally untenable.

C. Striking the Balance of Interests

The Court engaged in a rigorous balancing exercise under Article 21, weighing CP’s right to privacy and bodily autonomy against Amar’s structural right to know his biological lineage.

The Bench observed that Amar had spent his entire life watching his mother assert CP’s paternity, only to have state authorities repeatedly record inconclusive findings due to a lack of scientific evidence. Leaving the question unanswered would permanently jeopardize Amar’s civil status and strip him of the inheritance rights he would naturally be entitled to as CP’s biological son. Consequently, the Court ruled that the balance of interests tilted decisively in favor of the son, and CP’s privacy must yield to the demands of substantial justice.

5. Final Decretal Order

  • Appeal Dismissed: The Civil Appeal preferred by Chaturbhuj Pradhan is dismissed, and the judgment of the High Court of Chhattisgarh is affirmed[cite: 20].
  • Trial Mandate: The jurisdictional Civil Court (First Additional Civil Judge, Class-II, Basna) is directed to fix an expedited date to conduct the DNA test on the appellant[cite: 20].
  • Progression of Suit: The Trial Court shall obtain the medical results from the designated laboratory and proceed further with the pending civil declaration suit in strict accordance with the scientific findings[cite: 20].

Costs & Applications: All pending interlocutory applications stand formally disposed of, with no order as to costs[cite: 20].

2026 INSC 600

Chaturbhuj Pradhan V. Amar Pradhan & Anr. (D.O.J. 29.05.2026)

2026 INSC 600 click here to view full text of judgment

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Admissibility of Deceased Witness Testimony Against Absconding Accused

Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the State of West Bengal, ruling that the deposition of a deceased witness recorded in an earlier trial is admissible in a subsequent trial against an absconding accused, provided the requirements of Section 299 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) are met. The Court clarified that the provision serves to preserve evidence when an accused deliberately absconds, preventing them from benefiting from the unavailability of material witnesses due to the passage of time. The Court set aside the High Court’s order, which had denied the admission of the victim’s testimony, confirming that the statutory preconditions—the accused absconding and no immediate prospect of arrest—were satisfied at the time the witness deposed.

  • Background: In a 2012 gang-rape case, the respondent and another accused were absconding while three others were tried and convicted. The victim, a key witness, testified in the first trial but passed away in 2015. After the respondent was arrested in 2016, the prosecution sought to admit the victim’s earlier deposition as evidence under Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act read with Section 299 of the CrPC.
  • High Court Order: The High Court of Calcutta had rejected the application, observing that the prosecution had a duty to obtain a specific direction from the Trial Court to record evidence against the absconder during the first trial, and thus the earlier deposition could not be used against the respondent.
  • Interpretation of Section 299 CrPC: The Supreme Court held that Section 299 CrPC acts as an exception to the general rule requiring a witness to be examined in the presence of the accused. It does not mandate a formal, prior order from a Magistrate to record that the accused is absconding; rather, what is relevant is whether the conditions—that the accused is absconding and there is no immediate prospect of arrest—were established at the time the evidence was recorded.
  • Preventing Misuse of Process: The Court reasoned that taking a restrictive view of Section 299 would jeopardize the criminal justice system by incentivizing accused persons to wilfully abscond and await the death or unavailability of material witnesses.
  • Application to Facts: The Court noted that the respondent was a declared absconder when the victim’s testimony was recorded (2013), and he remained at large until his arrest in 2016. As the two essential conditions of Section 299(1) were met, the deceased victim’s evidence is admissible in the trial against the respondent.

Legislative Continuity: The Court noted that the legislature has maintained this principle in Section 335 of the recently enacted Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, reinforcing the intent to ensure evidence is preserved against those who evade trial.

2026 INSC 718

The State of West Bengal v. Kader Khan – (D.O.J. 17.07.2026)

2026 INSC 718 click here to view full text of judgment

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Insolvency and Bankruptcy: Finality of Resolution Plans and Extinguishment of Sub-judice Claims

Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the Successful Resolution Applicant (Appellant-SRA), ruling that upon the approval of a Resolution Plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), all claims—including those pending adjudication (sub-judice)—that are not specifically provided for in the plan stand extinguished. The Court held that the “clean slate” doctrine is fundamental to the IBC, preventing unresolved or contingent claims from resurfacing and undermining the revival of the corporate debtor. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court orders and dismissed the civil suit and arbitration proceedings initiated by operational creditors, affirming that they are bound by the terms of the approved Resolution Plan.

  • Background: The Appellant-SRA challenged Bombay High Court orders that allowed a civil recovery suit and arbitration proceedings to continue against the corporate debtor (Bhushan Steel Limited) despite the approval of its Resolution Plan. The respondents, operational creditors, sought to pursue claims that were pending at the time of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP).
  • Treatment of Claims: During the CIRP, the Resolution Professional admitted the respondents’ disputed claims at a notional value of Rupee One (1) each. The approved Resolution Plan stipulated that because the liquidation value was NIL, no amounts were due to operational creditors; however, a settlement fund was provided for those with admitted claims.
  • The “Clean Slate” Doctrine: The Court emphasized that a successful resolution applicant must start on a “clean slate,” free from “hydra-headed” surprise claims. Once a Resolution Plan is approved under Section 31(1) of the IBC, it becomes binding on all stakeholders, and claims not incorporated therein are deemed extinguished, withdrawn, or abated.
  • Finality of the Plan: The Court noted that the Final List of Creditors attained finality, and the respondents could not seek to reopen or question the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors after the plan’s approval. The Court found no merit in the allegations of fraud, noting that no proceedings had been initiated under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules to challenge the plan’s integrity.
  • No Express Carve-out: Upon a harmonious reading of the Resolution Plan, the Court concluded there was no express “carve-out” protecting sub-judice claims from extinguishment. The plan explicitly mandated that all legal proceedings relating to the period prior to the effective date stand extinguished, except to the extent of the specific settlement amount provided.
  • Observation on MSMEs: In an “Afterword,” the Court observed that the current insolvency framework does not adequately account for the position of small operational creditors and MSMEs, who are often placed at the bottom of the repayment waterfall. The Court suggested that the Legislature and Law Commission examine this to ensure a more balanced repayment mechanism.
  • Outcome: The Court allowed the appeals, set aside the contrary High Court orders, and dismissed the pending civil suit and arbitration proceedings, enforcing the finality of the Resolution Plan.

2026 INSC 717

M/S Tata Steel Ltd. v. Varsha & Anr. (D.O.J. 17.07.2026)

2026 INSC 717 click here to view full text of judgment

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Excluding Nominated Members from Local Authority Elections

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court of Karnataka’s decision to exclude nominated members of Town Panchayats from participating in Legislative Council elections for Local Authorities’ Constituencies. The Court ruled that under the constitutional framework established by the 74th Amendment (Part IX-A), nominated members, who serve only in an advisory capacity, lack the democratic mandate of elected representatives. Consequently, their inclusion in the electoral roll was declared unconstitutional, and the Court affirmed the direction to conduct a recount of votes after segregating the invalid votes cast by these nominated members.

  • Background: The election to the Karnataka Legislative Council (Chikkamagaluru Local Authorities Constituency) was challenged because 12 nominated members from four Town Panchayats were included in the electoral roll and participated in the voting. The appellant, who won by a narrow margin of 6 votes, contended that the electoral roll’s finality should be respected.
  • Constitutional Interpretation: The Court held that while Article 171(3)(a) mentions “members” of local authorities, this must be interpreted through the lens of the 74th Constitutional Amendment. Article 243-R establishes that while nominated members may be appointed for their expertise, they are expressly barred from voting in municipal meetings, underscoring their advisory rather than representative role.
  • Democratic Representation: The Supreme Court emphasized that allowing nominated members to vote in Legislative Council elections would undermine the democratic nature of the electoral process, as they are not democratically elected. The Court affirmed that “members” in the context of electoral colleges refers to democratically elected representatives.
  • Finality of Electoral Rolls: While acknowledging the principle that electoral rolls typically attain finality, the Court distinguished this case by noting that the inclusion of the nominated members was void ab initio and unconstitutional. Therefore, the finality of the roll could not be used to validate an illegality that strikes at the core of the electoral college’s composition.
  • Secrecy of the Ballot: The Court rejected the argument that segregating these votes would violate the secrecy of the ballot. It maintained that the higher constitutional goal of preserving free and fair elections and ensuring the purity of the electoral process outweighs the requirement for absolute secrecy in this specific context.
  • Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the High Court’s orders. The Court directed the authorities to proceed with the consequential actions based on the recount results already obtained, ensuring that the election outcome reflects only the valid votes cast by elected representatives.

2026 INSC 716

Pranesh M.K. v. Shanthegowda & Ors. – (D.O.J. 16.07.2026)

2026 INSC 716 click here to view full text of judgment

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Railway: Establishing Liability in Untoward Railway Incidents

The Supreme Court set aside the concurrent dismissal of a compensation claim by the Railway Claims Tribunal and the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The Court held that when a passenger dies in an “untoward incident” (falling from a running train), the absence of a recovered ticket does not automatically negate the status of a bona fide passenger. Emphasizing the “no-fault liability” principle under Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989, the Court ruled that once the claimant establishes the foundational facts through an affidavit, the burden shifts to the Railways. Technical lapses and the inability to recover personal belongings should not defeat the humanitarian and welfare objectives of the legislation.

  • Background: The appellant filed a claim for compensation following the death of her husband, who fell from a running train while traveling from Raipur to Ahmedabad. The Railway Claims Tribunal and the High Court previously rejected the claim, citing a lack of proof regarding the deceased being a bona fide passenger (specifically due to the missing ticket).
  • Legal Principle (No-Fault Liability): The Court reiterated that Section 124A of the 1989 Act is a beneficial, “no-fault” provision. It is designed to provide expeditious relief to victims of untoward incidents without requiring proof of negligence by the Railway Administration.
  • Burden of Proof: Relying on Union of India v. Rina Devi and Doli Rani Saha v. Union of India, the Court clarified that:
    • The mere absence of a ticket does not disprove that a person was a bona fide
    • The initial burden is on the claimant, which is sufficiently discharged by filing an affidavit stating the facts.
    • Once this is done, the burden shifts to the Railways to disprove the claim based on attending circumstances.
  • Operational Concerns: The Court highlighted the critical issue of chronic overcrowding in Indian Railways. It noted that while the Railway Manuals contain detailed safety and ticketing protocols, the execution often fails. The Court suggested that Railways should increase manpower to better manage safety and ticketing, which could simultaneously reduce such tragedies and provide employment.
  • Constitutional Perspective: The Court observed that using terms like “second class passenger” is outdated and potentially offensive to the spirit of the Constitution of India; it suggested that class designations should refer to the “coach” rather than the “passenger.”

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the lower court judgments. It ordered the Railways to pay compensation of ₹8,00,000 to the appellant within four weeks, failing which the amount would attract interest at 8% from the date of the original claim filing.

2026 INSC 715

Lata v. Union of India & Anr. – (D.O.J. 17.07.2026)

2026 INSC 715 click here to view full text of judgment

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