Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

Diffrence between Termination simpliciter of probationary From disguised punitive termination

In General Manager, Bank of Baroda and Others v. Ashok Kumar Singh and Others (Civil Appeal No. 4814 of 2017, decided on May 29, 2026), the Supreme Court of India adjudicated a vital service jurisprudence matter distinguishing a routine termination simpliciter of a probationary employee from a disguised punitive termination. The appeal was preferred by Bank of Baroda (as the successor-in-interest following the amalgamation of Vijaya Bank) against a Calcutta High Court Division Bench judgment that had affirmed the quashing of a probationary officer’s termination under Regulation 16(3)(a) of the Vijaya Bank (Officers’) Service Regulations, 1982. The bank contended that it possessed an absolute right to terminate an unconfirmed probationer based on its subjective satisfaction regarding unsatisfactory performance.

The Supreme Court dismissed the bank’s appeal and upheld the High Court’s findings that the termination order was legally unsustainable. The Division Bench of Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar ruled that while employers hold wide discretion to assess a probationer’s suitability, such discretion is not absolute or unchecked, and subjective satisfaction must be rooted in objective facts rather than arbitrariness or mala fides. Traveling behind the facade of the non-stigmatic termination order, the Court found that an alleged misconduct (unauthorized removal of confidential tender files) was the real foundation and motive for the discharge. It held that utilizing “unsatisfactory performance” as a deceptive disguise to bypass a formal disciplinary inquiry violates the principles of natural justice and administrative law. Consequently, the Court directed the bank to grant the employee 50% backwages alongside all consequential benefits notionally settled from the date of termination to his superannuation.

1. Factual Matrix & Employment Discord

  • The Probationary Appointment: Respondent No. 1 was appointed as the Assistant General Manager (AGM), Networking, on probation for an initial period of one year effective from his date of joining, January 5, 2004. His confirmation was explicitly subject to satisfactory conduct and performance.
  • The Alleged Misconduct and Suspension: Upon the expiry of his initial year, the employee was not confirmed. Instead, on January 15, 2005, the bank placed him under immediate suspension following allegations that he unauthorizedly attempted to remove four boxes of highly confidential tender documents relating to a “Manageable Switch Tender” from his office cabin through his personal driver.
  • Extensions and Revocation: While the bank issued a show-cause notice regarding the incident, his probation was extended for six months on February 16, 2005, retroactively from January 5, 2005, on the ground of unsatisfactory work. On April 12, 2005, the bank revoked his suspension “without prejudice to the Bank’s right to initiate disciplinary proceedings,” and transferred him to the Regional Office in Kolkata. On July 4, 2005, his probation was extended a second time for another six months.
  • The Abrupt Termination: On November 5, 2005, the bank invoked Regulation 16(3)(a) of the 1982 Regulations to terminate the employee’s services with immediate effect, ostensibly citing that his performance during the entire probationary timeline was unsatisfactory.
  • The Judicial Trajectory Below: The employee challenged his discharge via W.P. No. 2177 of 2005. A Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court allowed the writ petition on October 18, 2012, holding that the termination was arbitrary, based on irrelevant considerations, and a counter-blast to the suspension incident. The bank appealed to the Division Bench, which dismissed the appeal on October 16, 2015, prompting the bank to file a Civil Appeal before the Supreme Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Bank of Baroda was substituted as the primary appellant following the statutory amalgamation of Vijaya Bank in 2019.

2. Legal Issues for Determination

The core legal questions addressed by the Apex Court were:

  1. Whether the bank’s discretion to terminate a direct appointee during probation under Regulation 16(3)(a) is absolute and unqualified.
  2. Whether the termination in question was a genuine case of termination simpliciter for unsuitability or a disguised punitive discharge founded on alleged misconduct.
  3. Whether the evidentiary materials (performance memos) relied upon by the bank possessed valid legal weight to support a finding of poor performance.

3. Jurisprudential Benchmarks & Legal Analysis

A. The Limits of Probationary Discretion

The bank argued that a probationary employee possesses no inherent right to hold a permanent post, making full-scale inquiries or the communication of adverse material unnecessary prior to a standard termination simpliciter. The Supreme Court directly rejected this absolute stance:

  • Objective Baseline Required: Even under sweeping contractual or regulatory clauses, an employer acting as the “State” cannot terminate a probationer based on mere whims, caprices, or fancies. The subjective satisfaction of the competent authority must actively stand rooted in verifiable, objective facts and performance appraisals, ensuring it does not suffer from administrative arbitrariness.
  • The Purpose of Probation: The structural period of probation is designed to be a time of learning, alignment, and constructive evaluation. Withholding negative feedback or failing to communicate critical, stigmatic remarks (such as a lack of integrity) deprives the officer of a meaningful opportunity to improve, undermining the very fairness of the probationary scheme.

B. Piercing the Facade: Foundation vs. Motive

Drawing upon foundational service law precedents—including Parshotam Lal Dhingra (1958), Dipti Prakash Banerjee (1999), Mathew P. Thomas (2003), and the recent decision in Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of M.P. (2025)—the Court analyzed the delicate line between a non-stigmatic discharge and a punitive removal:

  • Travelling Beyond the Order: When testing a termination order that appears completely innocuous on its face, courts must examine the substance of the matter rather than its form. If the background and surrounding circumstances reveal that an unproved misconduct was the real basis and design behind getting rid of the employee, the misconduct is the foundation of the order, not a mere motive.
  • The Explanatory Office Note: The Court highlighted the bank’s internal office note dated November 5, 2005. The note explicitly recorded that the Chief Vigilance Officer, acting on the advice of the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), had originally directed major penalty disciplinary proceedings against the employee for the unauthorized file removal incident. However, because the employee was unconfirmed, the bank consciously altered its course to circumvent the onerous process of a formal departmental inquiry, explicitly seeking CVC clearance to terminate him administratively under Regulation 16(3)(a) instead. This sequence proved that the alleged misconduct was the real, calculating foundation of the bank’s action.

To justify its claim of “poor performance,” the bank relied upon three distinct internal memos issued during the extended probation period. The Supreme Court systematically decoupled these documents from any valid evidentiary value:

  • Memo dated 23.07.2005 (The OLTAS Issue): This memo criticized regional branch issues regarding the Online Tax Accounting System. The Court found this completely inconsistent with a formal letter issued a week prior (July 15, 2005) by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT), Ministry of Finance, which had explicitly lauded the bank’s OLTAS performance under the employee’s supervision as “praiseworthy” and advised other regional banks to consult him for implementation guidance. The memo was thus vitiated by extraneous considerations.
  • Memo dated 14.09.2005 (The Remittance Delay): This memo alleged specific procedural failures by the employee regarding a one-day delay in a Rs. 66 crore transfer. The Court reviewed communications where the State Bank of India (SBI) explicitly admitted that the delay arose from an internal technical error on their side. The employee had actually exhibited due diligence by pursuing SBI for interest on the delay, meaning no adverse inference could be drawn against him.
  • Memo dated 31.10.2005 (The Technology Irregularities): This memo contained severe allegations regarding data security breaches and improper behavior toward engineers. However, the bank admitted that this memo was never communicated or served upon the employee. The Court ruled that relying on uncommunicated adverse remarks to effect a termination acts as a direct violation of the principles of natural justice and holds no legal value.

4. Final Decretal Order

  • Appeal Disposed: The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of the High Court’s Single Bench and Division Bench quashing the termination.
  • Backwages Mandate: Recognizing that the termination order was completely bad in law, and balancing the unique facts of the long-pending dispute, the Court directed that Respondent No. 1 is entitled to 50% backwages computed from the date of his termination up to the specific date of his superannuation, alongside all consequential benefits applied notionally.
  • Amalgamation Compliance: The Court ordered that since Vijaya Bank stands amalgamated, the substituted appellant, Bank of Baroda, must fully settle and disburse all the directed financial and notional benefits within a mandatory period of three months.
  • Costs: Ordered with no order as to costs.

Follow-Up Question

To help tailor any further research or detailed analysis you might need, are you looking for a specific legal exploration of how this judgment balances the motive vs. foundation test compared to earlier apex benchmarks like Pavanendra Narayan Verma, or do you require a breakdown of how the Court computes “notional consequential benefits” for a probationer up to the age of superannuation?

2026 INSC 589

General Manager, Bank Of Baroda And Others  V. Ashok Kumar Singh And Others (D.O.J. 29.05.2026)

2026 INSC 589 click here to view full text of judgment

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Admissibility of Deceased Witness Testimony Against Absconding Accused

Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the State of West Bengal, ruling that the deposition of a deceased witness recorded in an earlier trial is admissible in a subsequent trial against an absconding accused, provided the requirements of Section 299 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) are met. The Court clarified that the provision serves to preserve evidence when an accused deliberately absconds, preventing them from benefiting from the unavailability of material witnesses due to the passage of time. The Court set aside the High Court’s order, which had denied the admission of the victim’s testimony, confirming that the statutory preconditions—the accused absconding and no immediate prospect of arrest—were satisfied at the time the witness deposed.

  • Background: In a 2012 gang-rape case, the respondent and another accused were absconding while three others were tried and convicted. The victim, a key witness, testified in the first trial but passed away in 2015. After the respondent was arrested in 2016, the prosecution sought to admit the victim’s earlier deposition as evidence under Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act read with Section 299 of the CrPC.
  • High Court Order: The High Court of Calcutta had rejected the application, observing that the prosecution had a duty to obtain a specific direction from the Trial Court to record evidence against the absconder during the first trial, and thus the earlier deposition could not be used against the respondent.
  • Interpretation of Section 299 CrPC: The Supreme Court held that Section 299 CrPC acts as an exception to the general rule requiring a witness to be examined in the presence of the accused. It does not mandate a formal, prior order from a Magistrate to record that the accused is absconding; rather, what is relevant is whether the conditions—that the accused is absconding and there is no immediate prospect of arrest—were established at the time the evidence was recorded.
  • Preventing Misuse of Process: The Court reasoned that taking a restrictive view of Section 299 would jeopardize the criminal justice system by incentivizing accused persons to wilfully abscond and await the death or unavailability of material witnesses.
  • Application to Facts: The Court noted that the respondent was a declared absconder when the victim’s testimony was recorded (2013), and he remained at large until his arrest in 2016. As the two essential conditions of Section 299(1) were met, the deceased victim’s evidence is admissible in the trial against the respondent.

Legislative Continuity: The Court noted that the legislature has maintained this principle in Section 335 of the recently enacted Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, reinforcing the intent to ensure evidence is preserved against those who evade trial.

2026 INSC 718

The State of West Bengal v. Kader Khan – (D.O.J. 17.07.2026)

2026 INSC 718 click here to view full text of judgment

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Insolvency and Bankruptcy: Finality of Resolution Plans and Extinguishment of Sub-judice Claims

Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the Successful Resolution Applicant (Appellant-SRA), ruling that upon the approval of a Resolution Plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), all claims—including those pending adjudication (sub-judice)—that are not specifically provided for in the plan stand extinguished. The Court held that the “clean slate” doctrine is fundamental to the IBC, preventing unresolved or contingent claims from resurfacing and undermining the revival of the corporate debtor. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court orders and dismissed the civil suit and arbitration proceedings initiated by operational creditors, affirming that they are bound by the terms of the approved Resolution Plan.

  • Background: The Appellant-SRA challenged Bombay High Court orders that allowed a civil recovery suit and arbitration proceedings to continue against the corporate debtor (Bhushan Steel Limited) despite the approval of its Resolution Plan. The respondents, operational creditors, sought to pursue claims that were pending at the time of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP).
  • Treatment of Claims: During the CIRP, the Resolution Professional admitted the respondents’ disputed claims at a notional value of Rupee One (1) each. The approved Resolution Plan stipulated that because the liquidation value was NIL, no amounts were due to operational creditors; however, a settlement fund was provided for those with admitted claims.
  • The “Clean Slate” Doctrine: The Court emphasized that a successful resolution applicant must start on a “clean slate,” free from “hydra-headed” surprise claims. Once a Resolution Plan is approved under Section 31(1) of the IBC, it becomes binding on all stakeholders, and claims not incorporated therein are deemed extinguished, withdrawn, or abated.
  • Finality of the Plan: The Court noted that the Final List of Creditors attained finality, and the respondents could not seek to reopen or question the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors after the plan’s approval. The Court found no merit in the allegations of fraud, noting that no proceedings had been initiated under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules to challenge the plan’s integrity.
  • No Express Carve-out: Upon a harmonious reading of the Resolution Plan, the Court concluded there was no express “carve-out” protecting sub-judice claims from extinguishment. The plan explicitly mandated that all legal proceedings relating to the period prior to the effective date stand extinguished, except to the extent of the specific settlement amount provided.
  • Observation on MSMEs: In an “Afterword,” the Court observed that the current insolvency framework does not adequately account for the position of small operational creditors and MSMEs, who are often placed at the bottom of the repayment waterfall. The Court suggested that the Legislature and Law Commission examine this to ensure a more balanced repayment mechanism.
  • Outcome: The Court allowed the appeals, set aside the contrary High Court orders, and dismissed the pending civil suit and arbitration proceedings, enforcing the finality of the Resolution Plan.

2026 INSC 717

M/S Tata Steel Ltd. v. Varsha & Anr. (D.O.J. 17.07.2026)

2026 INSC 717 click here to view full text of judgment

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Excluding Nominated Members from Local Authority Elections

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court of Karnataka’s decision to exclude nominated members of Town Panchayats from participating in Legislative Council elections for Local Authorities’ Constituencies. The Court ruled that under the constitutional framework established by the 74th Amendment (Part IX-A), nominated members, who serve only in an advisory capacity, lack the democratic mandate of elected representatives. Consequently, their inclusion in the electoral roll was declared unconstitutional, and the Court affirmed the direction to conduct a recount of votes after segregating the invalid votes cast by these nominated members.

  • Background: The election to the Karnataka Legislative Council (Chikkamagaluru Local Authorities Constituency) was challenged because 12 nominated members from four Town Panchayats were included in the electoral roll and participated in the voting. The appellant, who won by a narrow margin of 6 votes, contended that the electoral roll’s finality should be respected.
  • Constitutional Interpretation: The Court held that while Article 171(3)(a) mentions “members” of local authorities, this must be interpreted through the lens of the 74th Constitutional Amendment. Article 243-R establishes that while nominated members may be appointed for their expertise, they are expressly barred from voting in municipal meetings, underscoring their advisory rather than representative role.
  • Democratic Representation: The Supreme Court emphasized that allowing nominated members to vote in Legislative Council elections would undermine the democratic nature of the electoral process, as they are not democratically elected. The Court affirmed that “members” in the context of electoral colleges refers to democratically elected representatives.
  • Finality of Electoral Rolls: While acknowledging the principle that electoral rolls typically attain finality, the Court distinguished this case by noting that the inclusion of the nominated members was void ab initio and unconstitutional. Therefore, the finality of the roll could not be used to validate an illegality that strikes at the core of the electoral college’s composition.
  • Secrecy of the Ballot: The Court rejected the argument that segregating these votes would violate the secrecy of the ballot. It maintained that the higher constitutional goal of preserving free and fair elections and ensuring the purity of the electoral process outweighs the requirement for absolute secrecy in this specific context.
  • Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the High Court’s orders. The Court directed the authorities to proceed with the consequential actions based on the recount results already obtained, ensuring that the election outcome reflects only the valid votes cast by elected representatives.

2026 INSC 716

Pranesh M.K. v. Shanthegowda & Ors. – (D.O.J. 16.07.2026)

2026 INSC 716 click here to view full text of judgment

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Railway: Establishing Liability in Untoward Railway Incidents

The Supreme Court set aside the concurrent dismissal of a compensation claim by the Railway Claims Tribunal and the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The Court held that when a passenger dies in an “untoward incident” (falling from a running train), the absence of a recovered ticket does not automatically negate the status of a bona fide passenger. Emphasizing the “no-fault liability” principle under Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989, the Court ruled that once the claimant establishes the foundational facts through an affidavit, the burden shifts to the Railways. Technical lapses and the inability to recover personal belongings should not defeat the humanitarian and welfare objectives of the legislation.

  • Background: The appellant filed a claim for compensation following the death of her husband, who fell from a running train while traveling from Raipur to Ahmedabad. The Railway Claims Tribunal and the High Court previously rejected the claim, citing a lack of proof regarding the deceased being a bona fide passenger (specifically due to the missing ticket).
  • Legal Principle (No-Fault Liability): The Court reiterated that Section 124A of the 1989 Act is a beneficial, “no-fault” provision. It is designed to provide expeditious relief to victims of untoward incidents without requiring proof of negligence by the Railway Administration.
  • Burden of Proof: Relying on Union of India v. Rina Devi and Doli Rani Saha v. Union of India, the Court clarified that:
    • The mere absence of a ticket does not disprove that a person was a bona fide
    • The initial burden is on the claimant, which is sufficiently discharged by filing an affidavit stating the facts.
    • Once this is done, the burden shifts to the Railways to disprove the claim based on attending circumstances.
  • Operational Concerns: The Court highlighted the critical issue of chronic overcrowding in Indian Railways. It noted that while the Railway Manuals contain detailed safety and ticketing protocols, the execution often fails. The Court suggested that Railways should increase manpower to better manage safety and ticketing, which could simultaneously reduce such tragedies and provide employment.
  • Constitutional Perspective: The Court observed that using terms like “second class passenger” is outdated and potentially offensive to the spirit of the Constitution of India; it suggested that class designations should refer to the “coach” rather than the “passenger.”

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the lower court judgments. It ordered the Railways to pay compensation of ₹8,00,000 to the appellant within four weeks, failing which the amount would attract interest at 8% from the date of the original claim filing.

2026 INSC 715

Lata v. Union of India & Anr. – (D.O.J. 17.07.2026)

2026 INSC 715 click here to view full text of judgment

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