Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

Arbitration: Finality of arbitral awards and the boundaries of judicial non-interference

Picture of Judgments Online

Judgments Online

In Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. M/s Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd. (Civil Appeal No. 10877 of 2018, decided on May 29, 2026), the Supreme Court of India delivered a definitive ruling on the finality of arbitral awards and the boundaries of judicial non-interference under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“1996 Act”). The appeal was preferred by the Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. (MPRDC), a state public sector undertaking, against a Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment under Section 37 of the 1996 Act. The High Court had affirmed a District Court’s refusal to set aside a 2014 majority arbitral award that held MPRDC’s termination of a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) road project concession agreement to be unlawful and arbitrary, awarding substantial termination compensation and interest to the concessionaire, Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd. (JCPL).

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts and upholding the arbitral award in its entirety. The Division Bench of Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar strongly admonished the use of protracted litigation by state entities to stall the realization of legitimate dues, emphasizing that judicial interference under Sections 34 and 37 must remain strictly confined to the narrow legal parameters of the Act. The Court rejected MPRDC’s belated jurisdictional challenge under the state’s local arbitration law (Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983), ruling that the issue had already attained finality inter se the parties in prior rounds of litigation up to the Apex Court. Furthermore, the Court held that the arbitral tribunal’s interpretation of the concession agreement regarding termination payments was entirely plausible and entitled to deference, and that contractually agreed interest rates must be upheld under the principle of party autonomy.

1. Factual Matrix & Project Disruption

  • The Concession Agreement: On November 26, 2002, the appellant (MPRDC) invited proposals for a build-operate-transfer (BOT) road project encompassing the Jabalpur-Sagar-Damoh Road. A Malaysian company, Tiara Dhaya Maju Constructions, emerged as the successful bidder and incorporated a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)—the respondent, JCPL. On April 11, 2003, MPRDC, the parent company, and JCPL executed a Concession Agreement for a concession period of 5,440 days to design, engineer, finance, construct, operate, and maintain the 176-km project road. JCPL subsequently secured a loan agreement of ₹80.85 crores from EXIM Bank Malaysia to fund the project.
  • The Project Stalling and Termination: During implementation, severe differences arose. MPRDC failed to handover encumbrance-free vacant possession of the required land, severely hindering construction works. JCPL moved the High Court in March 2007 seeking mandamus for vacant land possession. While that petition was pending, MPRDC abruptly issued a termination notice on July 12, 2007, under Clause 32.2 of the agreement. By that time, JCPL had already infused and expended ₹49.47 crores of the project funds.
  • The Arbitral Reference: JCPL contested the termination as invalid and arbitrary, initiating institutional arbitration under the Rules of the Indian Council of Arbitration in 2011. JCPL claimed reimbursement for work done, return of seized machinery with hire charges, interest on the EXIM Bank loan, and exemplary damages, totaling ₹1,76,42,05,427. MPRDC filed counter-claims totaling ₹2,77,12,24,000, demanding among other items a refund of the project grant.

2. The Protracted Jurisdictional Battle

Before the merits of the dispute could be resolved, the case was heavily bogged down by parallel litigation regarding the tribunal’s jurisdiction:

  • The Section 14 Application: MPRDC moved the District Court under Section 14 of the 1996 Act to terminate the mandate of the private arbitrators, arguing that because the contract was a “works contract,” it fell under the exclusive statutory jurisdiction of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (“Adhiniyam”). The District Court accepted this in 2013, directing JCPL to approach the state statutory tribunal.
  • High Court and Supreme Court Finality: JCPL challenged the District Court’s order via a writ petition. On December 4, 2013, the Madhya Pradesh High Court set aside the order, holding that both parties clearly understood the distinction between a standard works contract and a BOT concession agreement, and had consciously opted for the 1996 Act. MPRDC challenged this before the Supreme Court, which dismissed its Special Leave Petition (SLP) on October 12, 2015, and subsequently dismissed a Review Petition on March 29, 2016, settling the jurisdictional issue inter se the parties.
  • The Awards: On August 22, 2014, the Arbitral Tribunal delivered a 2:1 majority award, allowing the claims of JCPL, dismissing MPRDC’s counter-claims, and awarding post-award interest at 18% per annum. MPRDC’s Section 34 application before the District Court was dismissed in 2016, as was its subsequent Section 37 appeal before the High Court, leading to the present final appeal before the Supreme Court.

3. Legal Analysis & Core Reasoning of the Supreme Court

A. The Narrowing Pyramid of Judicial Review

The Supreme Court contextualized its review by stressing the foundational principle of minimal court intervention enshrined in Section 5 of the 1996 Act. Justice J.K. Maheshwari observed that the jurisdiction of courts to upset an award behaves like a “narrowing pyramid”—the higher the court, the more hands-off its approach must be to safeguard arbitral autonomy. Under Sections 34 and 37, a court cannot act as an ordinary appellate forum to correct errors of fact or re-appreciate evidence. If the view taken by the arbitrator is a plausible interpretation of the contract, it must prevail.

B. Rejection of the Resurrected Jurisdictional Challenge

MPRDC sought to raise a fresh objection under Section 34(2)(b)(i), claiming the award was a nullity because a subsequent Full Bench High Court decision (Viva Highways Ltd., 2017) had overruled the 2013 writ court ruling and deemed concession agreements to be “works contracts”. The Supreme Court rejected this claim on multiple grounds:

  1. Issue Estoppel and Finality: Under the doctrine of issue estoppel, once a specific jurisdictional dispute has been litigated through the hierarchy of courts and finalized by the Supreme Court, it is “settled for eternity in the eye of law”. A subsequent change in judicial precedent or an overruling in an independent case does not reopen past decrees that attained finality between the same parties.
  2. Statutory Limitation and Waiver: MPRDC filed its Section 16 application before the tribunal after submitting its Statement of Defence, violating the strict timeline imposed by Section 16(2) of the 1996 Act.
  3. The Pre-dated Award Exception: Relying on P. Rural Road Development Authority v. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers and Contractors (2018) and Gayatri Project Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corpn. Ltd. (2025), the Court reiterated that where an award pre-dates the LG Chaudhary II judgment and the jurisdictional plea was either turned down under the then-prevailing law or raised past the appropriate stage, the award cannot be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction alone. Doing so would sanction perpetual litigation and crush the object of expediency.

C. Assessment on Merits: The Concession Contract Mechanics

MPRDC argued under Section 34(2)(a)(iv) that the tribunal went beyond the scope of reference by awarding a “Termination Payment” under Clause 32.4.2 when JCPL had merely claimed a “reimbursement of value of work done”. The Court dismissed this interpretation as completely disjointed:

  • Material Breach by State: The tribunal extensively evaluated the evidence and concluded that MPRDC’s failure to provide critical encumbrance-free land constituted a severe material breach, rendering its subsequent project termination illegal and void.
  • Holistic Claim Construction: Because the termination by the state was unlawful, the concessionaire was legally entitled to invoke its contractual remedies for termination payments under Clause 32.6. The definitional structure of “Termination Payment” under Clause 1.1.111 explicitly encompasses debt due, subordinated debt, and equity. Thus, the tribunal did not travel outside the reference; it harmoniously construed the claims which natively integrated these financial variables.
  • Privity of Contract: MPRDC’s alternative contention that the “debt due” portion of the award should have been ordered to be paid directly to the Malaysian lender, rather than to JCPL, was rejected. The lender had no privity of contract with MPRDC under the Concession Agreement. While the definition of termination payment accounts for liabilities owed to lenders, Clause 32.6 explicitly mandates that the payment is due and payable directly to the concessionaire.

D. Protection of Party Autonomy in Interest Rates

The Court strongly defended the high interest rates awarded by the tribunal (14.75% pre-award interest and 18% post-award interest):

  • Contractual Bargain: The pre-award interest of 14.75% was mathematically derived from the contractually agreed formula (SBI PLR plus two percent) under Clause 32.6. The post-award interest of 18% conformed exactly to the statutory default rate dictated by the unamended Section 31 of the 1996 Act.
  • Estoppel by Counter-Claim: Notably, MPRDC had itself claimed the identical interest rate of 14.75% in its own counter-claims before the tribunal.
  • The Threshold of Perversity: Party autonomy is the backbone of alternate dispute resolution. Courts must strictly uphold the commercial bargain struck by autonomous entities—especially when securing international finance—unless the rate is so profoundly shocking to the conscience that it demonstrates manifest perversity. Given MPRDC’s deployment of aggressive dilatory tactics to avoid its contractual debts for nearly two decades, the saddled interest was deemed entirely fair and just.

4. International Treaty Accountability & Institutional Policy

The Supreme Court integrated global economic concerns into its core administrative reasoning, emphasizing the nexus between judicial discipline and the national economy:

  • The Investment Treaty Reality Check: The respondent SPV represents a protected indirect foreign investment under the India-Malaysia Bilateral Investment Treaty, 1995. The Court took grim judicial notice of the fact that the ongoing domestic litigation had triggered diplomatic exchanges between the Malaysian High Commission and India’s Ministry of External Affairs.
  • Expropriation by Judicial Delay: Referencing international investment law jurisprudence (such as SAIPEM S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh), the Court warned that when domestic judiciaries arbitrarily misapply local standards to disrupt or delay valid institutional arbitral awards, such actions can cross the threshold into a “denial of justice,” amounting to an unlawful indirect expropriation of foreign capital under Bilateral Investment Treaties.
  • Ease of Doing Business: For a state to attract international infrastructure sponsors, there must be a baseline expectation of stability, reliability, and uniformity in the application of the rule of law. When public sector undertakings weaponize the court system to engage in a war of attrition against foreign investors, they cause structural harm to the national economic system.

5. Final Decretal Order

  • Appeal Dismissed: Civil Appeal No. 10877 of 2018 preferred by MPRDC is dismissed with all accompanying interim applications.
  • Disbursement Order to High Court Registry: The Registry of the Madhya Pradesh High Court is directed to immediately release the entire deposited amount, alongside all accumulated bank interest, directly to the respondent, JCPL, within a strict timeline of two weeks from the date of the judgment.
  • Payment Order to Appellant: MPRDC is ordered to calculate, settle, and disburse the entire remaining balance of the arbitral award, together with the contractually accrued interest, directly to JCPL within a mandatory window of three months.
  • Costs: Ordered with no order as to costs.

2026 INSC 590

Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. Through Its Managing Director  V. M/S Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd. Through Its Managing Director (D.O.J. 29.05.2026)

2026 INSC 590 click here to view full text of judgment

Share
Next Story

Political Rivalry & Limits of Bail: SC Cancels Sentence Suspension for Mastermind in Murder

November 2, 2026 No Comments

This criminal appeal arose from a challenge to an order of the High Court suspending the sentences of the accused respondents following their conviction for a murder stemming from political rivalry over a Sarpanch election. The appellant, father of the deceased victim, contested the High Court’s routine suspension of sentences, which was granted primarily due to the heavy backlog and long pendency of criminal appeals. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, ruling that while the suspension of sentence for the co-accused (where key prosecution witnesses turned hostile) did not warrant interference, the suspension granted to “A1” (the mastermind behind the conspiracy) was legally flawed. Emphasizing that courts cannot casually release convicts of heinous crimes simply due to systemic court delays, the Supreme Court cancelled the bail of A1 and directed him to surrender.

  • Background and Trial Conviction:
    • The crime involved the assassination of a candidate standing for bye-elections as a Sarpanch, orchestrated out of political rivalry.
    • “A1” (a government teacher whose faction lost influence) was convicted under Section 302 read with Section 120B IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment for masterminding the conspiracy, while other co-accused were convicted under Section 120B with 10 years of imprisonment.
    • The High Court suspended the sentences of the accused largely due to the impossibility of disposing of pending appeals in the near future.
  • Supreme Court’s Analysis Regarding the Mastermind (A1):
    • On a prima facie evaluation of evidence, the Supreme Court noted that witnesses testified to open threats made by A1 in the Returning Officer’s office stating the deceased would not stay alive until the election.
    • Furthermore, evidence from an Assistant Commissioner (PW40) established that A1 was present at a police station without provocation on the fateful day, pointing toward a deliberate attempt to create an alibi.
    • Given the compelling evidence of motive, threats, and calculated conspiracy, the High Court erred in granting bail to A1 solely based on appeal pendency.
  • Analysis Regarding the Co-Accused:
    • The prosecution alleged that the other respondents assisted by changing vehicle number plates, booking rooms, and purchasing SIM cards for the perpetrators.
    • However, material witnesses (such as PW8, PW12, PW13, PW27, PW66, PW67, and PW68) turned hostile or failed to establish the allegations, leaving insufficient direct material to disturb the High Court’s suspension of sentence for these co-accused.
  • Caution Against Routine Suspension of Sentences for Heinous Crimes:
    • The Court strongly criticized the knee-jerk practice of releasing convicts of heinous offences merely because appeals cannot be heard immediately, noting that it perils civil society and undermines public trust.
    • The bench underscored that courts must exercise circumspection, balance actual incarceration against appeal pendency, and remain sensitive to the trauma of victims’ families, since convicted persons no longer enjoy the presumption of innocence.
  • Final Orders and Directions:
    • The appeals were partly allowed.
    • The order suspending the sentence of A1 stands cancelled; he was directed to surrender before the Trial Court within two weeks.
    • The High Court’s order suspending the sentences of the other accused/respondents was left undisturbed.

2026 INSC 1180

Hanuman Prasad Hanuta Ram v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (D.O.J. 27.10.2026)

2026 INSC 1180 click here to view full text of judgment

Next Story

Weaponisation of Criminal Law in Failed Relationships: SC Sets Aside Prosecution for Rape and Cheating

November 2, 2026 No Comments

This criminal appeal arose from a common order passed by the High Court of Kerala, which dismissed the appellant’s revision petition and miscellaneous case, thereby refusing to discharge him from charges under Sections 376, 420, 493, 494, and 495 of the IPC. The complainant had alleged that the appellant deceived her into a temple marriage in 1996 while concealing his prior marriage and children, and that her consent to sexual relations over seven years was vitiated by this misconception. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and discharged the appellant, holding that the essential ingredients of the alleged offences were entirely absent because the complainant admitted to discovering the appellant’s prior marriage within six months of cohabitation yet voluntarily continued the relationship for years. Citing a worrying trend of converting failed consensual relationships into criminal prosecutions, the Court emphasized that criminal law cannot be weaponized to settle personal scores or exact revenge following emotional discord.

  • Factual Background & Lower Court Proceedings:
    • The appellant and respondent No. 2 lived together from 1996 to 2003 following a purported marriage ceremony at a temple in Mysuru.
    • After the relationship ended and domestic violence proceedings filed in 2008 were dismissed, respondent No. 2 filed a second private complaint that led to an FIR in 2011 for offences punishable under Sections 376, 420, 493, 494, and 495 of the IPC.
    • The Trial Court dismissed the appellant’s discharge application, and the Kerala High Court upheld that decision, ruling that a prima facie case of rape under misconception of fact was made out.
  • Legal Principles on Discharge (Section 277 CrPC):
    • Reaffirming principles from Prafulla Kumar Samal and Sajjan Kumar, the Supreme Court reiterated that at the stage of discharge, the court must sift and weigh evidence for the limited purpose of finding a prima facie case or grave suspicion. If the probability of the commission of the offence is non-existent, the accused is entitled to be discharged.
  • Analysis of Alleged Offences:
    • Rape (Section 376/375): The Court noted that the complainant admitted to being informed of the appellant’s prior marriage by his brother within six months of cohabitation, yet she continued to live with him voluntarily. A consensual relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as rape merely because the relationship soured years later.
    • Cheating (Section 420): There was no evidence that any deceit induced the complainant to deliver property or alter/destroy any “valuable security” as defined under Section 30 of the IPC.
    • Deceitful Cohabitation & Bigamy (Sections 493, 494, 495): Because the complainant continued cohabiting with full knowledge of the prior marriage and failed to establish a valid formal marriage beyond vague temple rituals, the core statutory ingredients were not satisfied.
  • Censure of Criminalizing Failed Relationships:
    • The Court expressed deep concern over a growing trend where courts witness consensual relationships that end in emotional discord being retrospectively combed for criminal elements.
    • While emphasizing the gravity of genuine sexual assault and the need to protect bodily autonomy, the Court cautioned that the justice system must not be turned into a tool for vengeance or financial coercion when adult relationships fail.
  • Final Order and Relief:
    • The Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders of the High Court and Trial Court.
    • The appellant’s discharge application was allowed, and he was completely discharged from all charges.

2026 INSC 1179

Santhosh Kumar N.P. v. State (Station House Officer, Kadirur Police) & Another (D.O.J. 30.10.2026)

2026 INSC 1179 click here to view full text of judgment

Share
Next Story

Judicial Discipline Overruled: The Illegality of Reviewing Binding Precedents on Tariff Fixation and Sinking Funds

November 2, 2026 No Comments

This appeal arose from a patent breach of judicial discipline by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, which allowed a review petition after more than five years and overturned a 2019 tariff fixation order that had strictly followed a binding precedent of the Supreme Court (Bhaskar Shrachi Alloys Limited v. Damodar Valley Corporation). The underlying issue concerned whether the “Sinking Fund” created by the Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) for redeeming bonds could be factored in as an item of expenditure in tariff determination alongside asset depreciation. The Supreme Court strongly criticized the Tribunal for overstepping the narrow contours of review, violating Article 141 of the Constitution, and attempting to rewrite settled tariff principles under the guise of correcting a “double benefit”. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned review order, restored the original 2019 Tribunal judgment, and imposed exemplary costs on the review petitioner and the intervening public sector undertaking.

  • Background and Statutory Context:
    • The dispute relates to tariff fixation for DVC for the period 2009 to 2014 under the Electricity Act, 2003, the DVC Act, 1948, and the CERC Tariff Regulations, 2009.
    • DVC is a statutory corporation created (on the lines of the US Tennessee Valley Authority) not only to generate power but also to handle flood control, irrigation, and socio-economic development of the Damodar Valley.
    • Under Section 40 of the DVC Act and Regulation 43 of the 2009 Regulations, DVC is permitted to recover both depreciation (stipulated by the C&AG) and funds established under Section 40 (such as Sinking Funds for bond redemption) through tariff recovery.
    • The core issue regarding the validity of the Sinking Fund as a pass-through in tariff had already been conclusively settled by the Supreme Court in Bhaskar Shrachi Alloys Limited v. DVC ((2018) 8 SCC 281), which underscored the overriding protective effect of the fourth proviso to Section 14 of the Electricity Act, 2003.
  • The Tribunal’s Erroneous Review Order:
    • Following the 2018 Supreme Court judgment, the Appellate Tribunal in 2019 upheld the CERC’s tariff order allowing the Sinking Fund.
    • However, upon a review petition filed by consumers (Maithan Alloys), the Tribunal reversed its stand after 5 years, ruling that allowing both depreciation on capital assets and contributions to the Sinking Fund amounted to an impermissible “double allowance” or duplication.
  • Supreme Court’s Legal Analysis & Findings:
    • Scope of Review: Citing established principles (such as State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta), the Supreme Court reiterated that an error which requires a long process of reasoning or debate cannot be termed an “error apparent on the face of the record”. A tribunal cannot sit in appeal over its own judgment or review it based on a supposed misconception that escaped notice.
    • Violation of Judicial Discipline and Article 141: The Tribunal’s action in reviewing an order based on a direct, binding Supreme Court precedent was labeled as “innovating at pleasure” and a clear violation of Article 141 of the Constitution.
    • Substantive Legality of Sinking Funds: The Court reaffirmed that Section 40 of the DVC Act departs from general accounting principles to accommodate DVC’s unique statutory mandate, allowing Sinking Funds to be treated as a first charge/expense deductible before net profits are determined.
  • Relief and Costs Awarded:
    • The impugned review order of the Tribunal was set aside, and the original Tribunal order dated May 17, 2019, was restored.
    • Noting that the review petition was an abuse of process and that the intervenor Public Sector Undertaking (Steel Authority of India Ltd.) ill-advisedly supported a breach of judicial discipline, the Court imposed exemplary costs:
      • 2,00,000 (Rupees Two Lakh) to be paid by the 1st Respondent (Maithan Alloys Limited) to DVC.
      • 1,50,000 (Rupees One Lakh and Fifty Thousand) to be paid by the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) to DVC.
    • Failure to pay within one month will attract an 18% per annum interest rate.

2026 INSC 1178

Damodar Valley Corporation v. Maithan Alloys Limited & Ors. (D.O.J. 30.10.2026)

2026 INSC 1178 click here to view full text of judgment

Share
Next Story

Strangers to a Consent Decree: Safeguarding Rights and Access to Appeal Against Fraudulent Compromises

November 2, 2026 No Comments

This appeal arose from a challenge to interim orders and a final judgment passed by the High Court of Gujarat, which condoned an 11-year delay, granted leave to appeal to non-parties (strangers to the suit), and maintained an ad interim injunction. The dispute centered around a 2012 specific performance suit that culminated in a consent decree in 2013, through which the appellant ultimately secured a sale deed in 2022 via a Court Commissioner. The original respondents (heirs/members of a Hindu Undivided Family), alleging fraud and collusion, sought to challenge the consent decree. The Supreme Court dismissed the appellant’s appeals, holding that the statutory bar under Section 96(3) and Order XXIII Rules 3 and 3A of the CPC applies only to parties to a compromise, and that strangers whose independent rights are prejudiced can maintain an appeal with the leave of the court. The Court also upheld the condonation of delay and the interim protection, emphasizing that non-parties cannot be deemed to have prior knowledge of a collusive decree.

  • Background and Procedural Context:
    • A civil suit for specific performance (Civil Suit No. 322 of 2012) was filed by a housing society against the heirs of an original land owner, which rapidly ended in a compromise consent decree on April 29, 2013.
    • Execution proceedings were initiated in 2020, leading to a registered sale deed executed by a Court Commissioner in June 2022 in favour of the appellant, Girishbhai Natwarlal Patel (who had previously acted as a power-of-attorney holder for the defendants in the suit).
    • Respondent Nos. 1 to 9, claiming through a family HUF that held historical revenue interests, discovered the alienation in 2023, filed an appeal with an application for leave to appeal, and secured an ex parte ad interim injunction from the High Court in 2024, which was later confirmed along with an 11-year delay condonation.
  • Maintainability of Appeal by a Stranger to a Consent Decree:
    • The Supreme Court clarified that while Section 96(3) of the CPC and Order XXIII Rule 3A bar parties to a compromise from challenging a consent decree via separate suits or standard appeals, these provisions do not apply to strangers to the decree.
    • Non-parties who assert an independent legal interest that is prejudicially affected by a fraudulent or collusive decree are entitled to seek leave to appeal under Section 96 of the CPC.
  • Principles Governing Leave to Appeal for Non-Parties:
    • Citing precedents such as N. Krishna Murthy, Jatan Kumar Golcha, and H. Anjanappa, the Court reiterated that a stranger cannot file an appeal unless they qualify as an “aggrieved person” whose legal rights or interests are directly jeopardized.
    • The material on record—including the appellant’s dual role under a power of attorney for the defendants while linked to the plaintiff society—disclosed a sufficient prima facie grievance to warrant appellate scrutiny, without foreclosing the final merits.
  • Validity of Condonation of Delay:
    • The 11-year delay was validly condoned because the contesting respondents were not parties to the original suit and could not be imputed with constructive knowledge of the proceedings from the date of the decree.
    • Their explanation regarding discovering the revenue mutation changes in 2023 and acting promptly thereafter justified the exercise of judicial discretion.
  • Supreme Court’s Final Directions:
    • The appeals filed by the appellant were dismissed in entirety.
    • The Supreme Court requested the High Court of Gujarat to expedite the hearing of the main First Appeal and dispose of it within three months.

2026 INSC 1177

Girishbhai Natwarlal Patel v. Gautam Punjabhai Palkhiwala (Dead) by LRs & Ors. (D.O.J. 30.10.2026)

2026 INSC 1177 click here to view full text of judgment

Share

The specified slider does not exist.

Recent Articles

Hi Judgments Online

Subscribed
Logins