Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

State’s Power to Surcharge: Constitutional Validity of Sales Tax Enhancements Upheld

This landmark decision by a Seven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India resolves a nearly three-decade-old reference regarding the legislative competence of State Legislatures under Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The core legal question was whether a State could validly levy an additional tax, surcharge, or cess calculated as a percentage of the sales tax payable by a dealer (rather than directly on their turnover), or whether such an imposition amounted to an unconstitutional “tax on tax” or a tax on the dealer’s income.

The Court unanimously held that the reference was rendered infructuous/academic in light of subsequent constitutional and legal developments—notably the Nine-Judge Bench ruling in Mineral Area Development Authority (MADA) v. SAIL (2024). Reaffirming the Five-Judge Constitution Bench precedent in S. Kodar v. State of Kerala (1974), the Court ruled that an additional tax or surcharge calculated on sales tax payable is in substance an enhancement of the rate of sales tax on the aggregate sales of a dealer. It remains fully valid under Entry 54 of List II as a tax on the sale or purchase of goods, and does not constitute an invalid tax on income or a “tax on tax”.

  1. Background & Scope of Issues
  • The Surcharge Structure: The primary lead appeal arose out of Section 5-A of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, which levied a 10% surcharge on the total sales tax payable by dealers whose gross turnover exceeded ₹10 lakhs. Similar provisions under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 (Section 5(1-C) and Section 30-AA) were also challenged.
  • The Assessees’ Contention: Dealers argued that a surcharge computed on the tax payable (rather than directly on turnover) was a “tax on tax” or a levy on the dealer’s income/fiscal burden, exceeding State competence under Entry 54 of List II.
  • Origin of Reference: The reference originated in 1998 due to a perceived conflict between Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1983) and the Seven-Judge Bench decision in India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu (1990), which held a local cess on royalty to be an invalid “cess on royalty/tax on tax”.
  1. Key Legal & Constitutional Findings
  • Subject of Tax vs. Measure of Tax: The Court highlighted the settled distinction between the taxable event (subject of tax) and the yardstick for quantification (measure of tax). A surcharge of 10% on a 10% sales tax is arithmetically equivalent to a 1% additional tax on turnover. The mode of computation does not alter the essential character of the levy as a tax on the sale or purchase of goods.
  • Not a Tax on Income: The surcharge escalates with turnover volume, not profit. It remains payable even if a dealer incurs a loss, ensuring it cannot be characterized as an income tax. Furthermore, a tax does not lose its character as a sales tax merely because a dealer is statutorily prohibited from passing the burden on to consumers.
  • Resolution of Conflict (India Cement & MADA):
    • The perceived conflict with India Cement (1990) was cleared by the Nine-Judge Bench in MADA v. SAIL (2024), which overruled India Cement to the extent it held that “royalty is a tax”.
    • Because royalty is a contractual consideration and not a tax, the premise that India Cement disallowed a “tax on tax” is legally non-existent.
  • Continued Authority of S. Kodar: The Five-Judge Bench decision in S. Kodar v. State of Kerala (1974) remains solid, binding precedent. It conclusively establishes that additional sales tax/surcharge based on tax payable is a valid enhancement of sales tax rates.
  • Altered Constitutional Landscape: Following the 101st Constitutional Amendment Act (2016) introducing the Goods and Services Tax (GST) regime and modifying Entry 54 of List II, the legacy sales tax surcharges relate exclusively to past assessment periods.
  1. Directions & Segregation of Residual Matters
  1. Reference Answered: The reference is answered as infructuous/academic. The legislative competence of States to impose sales tax surcharges is governed by S. Kodar.
  2. Segregation of Punjab Social Security Cess: The challenges to the Punjab Social Security Act, 2000 (concerning Article 266 Consolidated Fund compliance) are delinked/segregated to be decided separately by a Division Bench.
  3. Exempted Units (Section 30-AA of Punjab Act): Specific statutory questions regarding whether exempted industrial units can be made liable to pay surcharge under Section 30-AA of the Punjab Act are left open for determination on individual merits by regular Benches.
  4. Disposal of Appeals: The Registry was directed to list individual appeals before appropriate regular Benches for final disposal in accordance with the law laid down in S. Kodar.

2026 INSC 1192

Arjun Flour Mills v. The State of Odisha Finance Department Secretary & Ors. (with connected appeals) (D.O.J. 04.11.2026)

2026 INSC 1192 click here to view full text of judgment

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Supreme Court Strikes Down UP Pension Exclusion Amendments

The Supreme Court of India adjudicated a monumental batch of writ petitions and civil appeals concerning the constitutional validity of successive validating legislations enacted by the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Court held that the Uttar Pradesh Entitlement to Pension and Validation Acts of 2021 and 2025 were unconstitutional, ruling that the legislature cannot simply change statutory vocabulary to disguise and perpetuate an exclusionary policy previously read down as discriminatory by the judiciary. The judgment reaffirmed that once work-charged, daily-wage, or muster-roll service is regularised by the State, such antecedent service must be counted as qualifying service for computing pensionary benefits.

  • The Genesis of the Conflict: The dispute spanned several decades involving employees from the Public Works, Ground Water, and Irrigation departments of Uttar Pradesh who were engaged between the 1970s and 1980s. While their services were subsequently regularised, the State persistently refused to count their pre-regularisation, work-charged, or daily-wage tenures as “qualifying service” for pension eligibility.
  • The Precedent in Prem Singh: In a landmark 2019 ruling (Prem Singh v. State of UP), the Supreme Court read down Rule 3(8) of the 1961 Rules, declaring the total exclusion of work-charged tenure from pension calculations as impermissibly discriminatory and unconstitutional. The State’s subsequent review and curative petitions against this verdict were entirely dismissed.
  • Aggressive Legislative Overrulings: Attempting to bypass the binding Prem Singh mandamus, the UP Government aggressively introduced retrospective ordinances and validation enactments in 2021 and 2025. These new provisions redefined “qualifying service” and restricted pensions exclusively to a “substantive appointee,” effectively reviving the exact same multi-decade exclusion under a modified linguistic garb.
  • The True Constitutional Test of Validation: Justice Dipankar Datta clarified that while a competent legislature has the generic power to retrospectively alter the legal fulcrum of a judgment, it must genuinely correct the underlying legal or constitutional defect (Prithvi Cotton Mills standard). The Court ruled that changing the labels of the statutory vocabulary while leaving the substantive discrimination untouched is a disguised administrative subterfuge that fails to cure the core constitutional infirmity.
  • Vested Rights and Sincere Administration: Citing historical administrative practices and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s warnings against perverting the spirit of the Constitution through administrative adjustments, the Court held that a worker’s birthmark of temporary appointment stands obliterated upon formal regularisation. The State cannot retroactively strip away vested retiral rights using deeming fictions. Consequently, the subsequent validating acts were struck down, and the High Court judgments favoring the regularised employees were sustained.

2026 INSC 1252

Uttar Pradesh Ground Water Department Non Gazetted Employee Association (Regd.) & Anr. v. The Chief Secretary & Ors. (D.O.J. 19.11.2026)

2026 INSC 1252 click here to view full text of judgment

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Supreme Court Limits Arbitral Award to Pre-Reference Cap

The Supreme Court of India allowed civil appeals filed by Neycer (India) Ltd., ruling that an arbitrator cannot unilaterally widen their jurisdiction beyond the quantified pecuniary limits specified in the original reference documents. The apex court set aside a Calcutta High Court Division Bench order that had restored an expanded Umpire award of ₹11.69 crore. It reinstated the Single Judge’s decision restricting the principal award to the contractually capped sum of ₹2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore) after determining that claims exceeding this threshold constituted an error in excess of jurisdiction.

  • The Arbitral Reference Threshold: The dispute arose from a 1986 technical collaboration agreement between Neycer and GMB Ceramics Ltd. When differences cropped up regarding project overruns, GMB formally invoked arbitration and specifically defined its claim in its foundational nomination document as a quantified loss of “over Rs. 2 crores”. GMB later amended its claims before the Umpire to aggregate to over ₹17.16 crore.
  • Jurisdictional Error vs. Plausible Construction: The Umpire awarded GMB ₹11,69,62,910/-. The Single Judge capped it at ₹2 crore, but the High Court’s Division Bench reversed this, labeling the Umpire’s expansive reading of the reference documents as a “plausible interpretation”. The Supreme Court corrected this view, clarifying that while an arbitrator’s interpretation of a contract is insulated if it is a plausible view, they cannot arrogate jurisdiction to themselves by misconstruing the clear boundaries of a reference.
  • Rejection of Speculative Damage Models: The Court criticized the Umpire for awarding ₹2.03 crore under Schedule ‘C’ for brand-building damages based on a hypothetical advertising estimate from 1990. Because the award was passed in 1999, the relevant five-year window had already passed. GMB’s actual audited financial statements showed it spent only around ₹35 lakh on marketing, proving that hypothetical projections cannot override real, available accounting figures.
  • Misconstruction of Contractual Obligations: The Court observed that the Umpire wrongly treated the advisory collaboration as a turnkey joint venture guarantee. Contractual phrases like “shall endeavour” indicate an obligation to make earnest efforts rather than absolute underwriting of open-ended business profits or compound debt interest when the plant faced independent labor disputes.
  • Final Resolution: Noting that this corporate litigation has gridlocked for nearly 40 years, the Supreme Court modified the award back to the principal limit of ₹2,00,00,000/-. Since Neycer had already deposited ₹4,00,00,000/- (₹2 crore principal and ₹2 crore interest) which GMB withdrew in 2019, the Court directed this payment to be adjusted as full and final satisfaction of the long-standing dispute.

2026 INSC 1251

Neycer (India) Ltd. v. GMB Ceramics Ltd. (D.O.J. 18.11.2026)

2026 INSC 1251 click here to view full text of judgment

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Supreme Court Restores Trial Court Control Over Sri Guru Sangha

The Supreme Court of India allowed a batch of civil appeals concerning the administration of Sri Guru Sangha, a charitable society. The Court set aside the Calcutta High Court’s orders, thereby restoring the Trial Court’s decisions to remove a Special Officer, establish a 13-member ad hoc management committee, and reject applications for automatic impleadment. The apex court ruled that the High Court exceeded its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 by erroneously substituting its own views for the well-reasoned interim administrative and party-joinder directions issued by the subordinate trial court.

  • Origin of the Dispute: The proceedings arose out of a representative suit (Title Suit No. 105 of 2012) under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) seeking the removal of certain office bearers and the implementation of a management scheme for the central Ashram of Sri Guru Sangha in Kolkata.
  • Removal of Special Officer and Committee Formation: The Trial Court initially appointed a Special Officer to oversee the society. Following allegations of administrative irregularities, the Trial Court considered the officer’s written response and subsequently replaced her by appointing a 13-member ad hoc management committee equipped with reporting and auditing safeguards. The Calcutta High Court stayed this layout under the mistaken premise that the officer was denied a fair hearing.
  • Boundaries of High Court Supervisory Power: Restoring the ad hoc committee, the Supreme Court emphasized that Article 227 supervisory jurisdiction is strictly reserved for patent jurisdictional errors, perversity, or grave miscarriages of justice. It does not allow High Courts to automatically correct regular errors of fact or law, nor replace a subordinate court’s discretion with its own conclusions.
  • Rejection of Automatic Impleadment Rights: The High Court had also overturned the Trial Court’s rejection of third-party impleadment requests made by certain members. The Supreme Court ruled that while a Section 92 suit is representative, Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC does not provide an automatic right of impleadment to every devotee or member. Applicants must establish specific necessity rather than making generic allegations of mismanagement.
  • Final Disposition: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s interventions and fully restored the Trial Court’s operational orders dated June 7, 2022, and September 9, 2025, clarifying that the Trial Court remains fully competent to independently handle any freshly raised financial or structural grievances.

2026 INSC 1250

Subhasindu Das & Ors. v. Bachhu Ranjan Das & Ors. Etc. (D.O.J. 19.11.2026)

2026 INSC 1250 click here to view full text of judgment

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Supreme Court Orders Counselling for Child Tutored by Father

The Supreme Court of India initiated contempt proceedings against a father who willfully breached a court-recorded mutual settlement by taking his minor son from his Delhi school to Rajasthan and unlawfully retaining his custody. While holding the father in clear contempt, the Court determined that an abrupt restoration of custody to the mother would harm the severely brainwashed 6-year-old child’s psychology. Consequently, exercising its inherent parental role, the Court directed the Family Court at Dholpur to orchestrate influence-free child counselling sessions aimed at rebuilding the child’s trust in his mother and sister, and avoiding long-term sibling alienation.

  • The Original Compromise Deed: The case originates from a Transfer Petition filed by the petitioner-mother. During mediation, the spouses reached a mutual settlement recorded by the Supreme Court on December 12, 2025. According to the compromise, exclusive custody of their two children (an 11-year-old daughter and a 6-year-old son) was awarded to the mother, while the father received limited visitation rights to take them to Dholpur, Rajasthan, twice a year for four days each.
  • Violation and Unlawful Abduction: The mother filed the present contempt petition alleging that on July 22, 2026, the father abused his visitation rights by going to the minor son’s school in Mayur Vihar, Delhi, and abducting him to Rajasthan. The father unlawfully retained custody of the son for nearly four months, ignoring formal legal notices and parental requests.
  • Severe Tutoring and Substance Abuse Concerns: Upon presenting the child in Chambers, the Supreme Court noted that the father had intentionally brainwashed and poisoned the child’s mind against his mother and sister. The child aggressively resisted returning to his mother. Furthermore, the Court noted that during visual interactions, the father displayed clear, prima facie physiological signs of substance abuse.
  • Mitigating Sibling and Parental Alienation: The Bench observed that the father’s actions were deliberately creating an environment of sibling alienation. However, because a sudden physical relocation might leave a permanent psychological scar, the Court deferred an immediate return of the child.
  • Mandatory Counselling Directives: The Supreme Court ordered the Family Court, Dholpur, to immediately engage a child counsellor. The father must present the child for sessions held in an influence-free, separate room inside the court premises, with all costs borne entirely by the father. The counsellor’s primary objective is to restore the child’s faith and trust in his maternal family. The final counselling evaluation must be submitted to the Supreme Court in a sealed cover by January 22, 2027, for further orders.

2026 INSC 1249

Poornima Gupta v. Saurav Gupta (D.O.J. 19.11.2026)

2026 INSC 1249 click here to view full text of judgment

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