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PMLA: Hearing of accused at the pre-cognizance stage

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The applicability of the mandatory rule under the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS IS Core issue, which requires giving the accused a hearing before taking cognizance, to a PMLA complaint filed before the BNSS came into force but where cognizance was taken after its commencement.The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and the Special Court’s cognizance order, holding that the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS is substantive and mandatory. The Special Court was directed to afford the appellant an opportunity to be heard at the stage of taking cognizance.

1. Factual Background

  • ECIR and Arrest: The Directorate of Enforcement (ED/Respondent) registered an ECIR against Parvinder Singh (Appellant) on July 24, 2023, and subsequently arrested him on April 27, 2024.
  • Filing of Complaint: The ED filed a prosecution complaint under Sections 44 and 45 of the PMLA on June 24, 2024, before the designated Special Court. On the same day, the Special Court ordered the complaint to be registered as a miscellaneous case and fixed a hearing for cognizance.
  • Transition to BNSS: On July 1, 2024, the old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) was repealed and replaced by the BNSS.
  • Cognizance and Recall: On July 2, 2024 (after the BNSS took effect), the Special Court took cognizance of the offence without giving the appellant a prior hearing. The appellant later filed an application to recall the cognizance order, citing a breach of the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS. The Special Court dismissed this application on March 22, 2025, calling it a dilatory tactic, and proceeded to frame charges.

2. High Court’s Ruling

The Appellant challenged the orders before the High Court of Uttarakhand. The High Court dismissed the challenge against the cognizance order, ruling that because the PMLA proceedings were initiated before the BNSS commenced, the old CrPC applied pursuant to the savings clause under Section 531(2)(a) of the BNSS. It did, however, partly allow the other revision by quashing the framed charges and remanding the matter back for a fresh hearing on charges.

3. Arguments Raised

  • On Behalf of the Appellant: It was argued that the provisions governing complaints under the CrPC/BNSS seamlessly apply to PMLA trials since there is no textual inconsistency. Because cognizance was taken on July 2, 2024, the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS was fully active and mandated a pre-cognizance hearing for the accused. A mere ministerial act like numbering a complaint before July 1 did not qualify as a pending “inquiry” to trigger the savings clause of the old CrPC.
  • On Behalf of the Respondent (ED): The Additional Solicitor General (ASG) contended that the PMLA is a standalone special enactment, meaning general chapters of the BNSS regarding magistrate complaints do not apply. Alternatively, the ED argued that an “inquiry” had already commenced prior to July 1, 2024, when the court first dealt with the complaint, meaning the old CrPC was correctly applied under Section 531(2)(a) of the BNSS. They also argued that no actual prejudice was suffered by the appellant due to the lack of a hearing.

4. Key Legal Issues & Findings of the Supreme Court

A. Interplay Between PMLA and the CrPC / BNSS

The Supreme Court re-affirmed its established precedents (Tarsem Lal, Yash Tuteja, and Kushal Kumar Agarwal) holding that provisions regulating complaint procedures (previously Sections 200–205 of the CrPC, now Sections 223–228 of the BNSS) apply directly to PMLA complaints. There is no structural inconsistency between these statutes. Denying this linkage would dangerously strip a PMLA Special Court of basic powers, such as dismissing meritless complaints or dispensing with personal attendance.

B. Definition of “Inquiry” and Section 531(2)(a) of the BNSS

The Court clarified that under Section 2(1)(k) of the BNSS, an “inquiry” is a conscious, judicial act requiring the application of a judicial mind.

  • A purely administrative or ministerial act—such as directing a complaint to be numbered and fixing a future date for a cognizance hearing—does not constitute the commencement of an inquiry.
  • Drawing from Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, the Court held that since judicial mind had not been applied to the complaint before July 1, 2024, no inquiry was legally pending under the old CrPC. Consequently, the savings clause in Section 531(2)(a) could not be utilized to bypass the BNSS.

C. Nature of the First Proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS

The Court delivered a landmark interpretation regarding the pre-cognizance hearing rule:

  • Substantive Right: The first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS is not merely a procedural or regulatory mechanism; it is substantive in nature. It directly feeds into the right to a fair trial protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
  • Mandatory Character: The word “shall” in the proviso is strictly mandatory.
  • Effect of Non-compliance: Taking cognizance without granting the accused a prior opportunity to be heard is an illegality that renders the order void ab initio. The prosecution’s argument that the accused must demonstrate “prejudice” was completely rejected, as this constitutes an absolute illegality rather than a curable procedural irregularity.

5. Final Direction

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and the Special Court’s cognizance order dated July 2, 2024. The case was remanded to the Special Court with a directive to grant the appellant a proper hearing at the pre-cognizance stage and complete the entire exercise within 8 weeks.

2026 INSC 519

Parvinder Singh V. Directorate of Enforcement (D.O.J. 19.05.2026)

2026 INSC 519 click here to view full text of judgment

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Bribes Carry No Immunity: Inapplicability of Section 17A Prior Approval to Demands for Illegal Gratification

October 18, 2026 No Comments

This appeal arose from a judgment of the Rajasthan High Court which dismissed the appellant’s criminal revision petition challenging the framing of charges under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act). The appellant, a police constable, was accused of demanding a bribe of Rs. 1.5 lakhs on behalf of a Superintendent of Police. The primary contention raised by the appellant was that the inquiry and investigation were vitiated for want of prior approval under Section 17A of the PC Act.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the concurrent orders of the High Court and the Trial Court. The Court held that Section 17A of the PC Act—which mandates prior approval before investigating a public servant—applies strictly to recommendations made or decisions taken in the discharge of official functions or duties, and by no stretch of imagination can it be extended to cases involving the demand or acceptance of illegal gratification, which are pure criminal acts unrelated to official duties.

Summary of the Judgment

  • Scope and Intent of Section 17A of the PC Act:
    • Section 17A prohibits police officers from conducting inquiries or investigations into offences alleged against a public servant where the offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken in discharge of official functions or duties, without prior approval from the competent authority.
    • The provision is designed to protect public servants from malicious interference in bona fide administrative or quasi-judicial decision-making, but it does not provide an omnibus protective umbrella or blanket immunity for criminal misconduct.
  • Exclusion of Bribery and Illegal Gratification:
    • Criminal acts such as misappropriation, cheating, criminal breach of trust, and receiving bribes or demanding illegal gratification are completely foreign to the discharge of official duties.
    • Reaffirming precedents like Central Bureau of Investigation v. Santosh Karnani and Anil Daima v. State of Rajasthan, the Court reiterated that demanding a bribe is a pure criminal act that has no linkage with official recommendations or decisions, thereby rendering Section 17A completely inapplicable.
  • Validity of Prosecution Sanction:
    • The record indicated that valid prosecution sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act had been duly granted prior to the taking of cognizance. The Court noted that even if any procedural irregularity were claimed regarding sanction timing, it would not vitiate the trial on merits.
  • Final Outcome:
    • The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the lack of prior approval under Section 17A did not vitiate the proceedings because the provision was never attracted to allegations of bribery.

2026 INSC 1147

Tejaram v. State of Rajasthan (D.O.J. 16.10.2026)

2026 INSC 1147 click here to view full text of judgment

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Protection of Water Bodies vs. Bona Fide Flat Buyers: Balancing State Resumption with Equitable Relief

October 18, 2026 No Comments

These civil appeals arose from orders passed by the Madras High Court which dismissed challenges against the Commissioner of Land Administration’s order setting aside a fraudulently granted ryotwari patta over a water body (Kanakkan Pillai Kuttai) and ordering the demolition of residential apartments built thereon. The land in question (Survey No. 572, Thirumullaivoyal Village) was historically classified in revenue records as Government Poramboke (tank/water body). Despite Section 14-A of the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, which strictly prohibits ryotwari pattas on private tanks or ooranis, a District Revenue Officer illegally granted a patta in 2011, leading to commercial subdivision, bank mortgaging, and construction of residential flats sold to innocent buyers.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that public water bodies vest in the State free from encumbrances and cannot be converted into ryoti land or alienated. However, taking cognizance of the plight of innocent flat buyers who purchased properties backed by municipal approvals and revenue mutations, the Supreme Court invoked equitable measures, directing the Chief Secretary and District Collector to allot a vacant, commensurate site to the flat owners within six months before proceeding with the demolition of the 0.22-acre constructed area.

  • Non-Ryoti Nature of Water Bodies and Section 14-A:
    • Beds and bunds of tanks, channels, and communal poramboke lands do not constitute “ryoti land” under Section 3(16) of the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948.
    • Section 14-A of the Act explicitly prohibits the grant of ryotwari pattas for private tanks or ooranis and mandates the cancellation of any patta erroneously or mistakenly issued over such water bodies.
    • Historical revenue records (such as the 1911 RSR Register) take precedence, and municipal zoning notifications (such as “Mixed Residential Zone” under the Town and Country Planning Act) cannot efface the statutory character of public water bodies or transfer ownership.
  • Administrative Fraud and Unauthorized Patta:
    • The 2011 order granting a ryotwari patta was marred by fabricated file numbers, absent jurisdictional reports, and clear administrative malpractices, justifying its annulment by the Commissioner of Land Administration.
  • Protection of Bona Fide Flat Buyers and Equitable Relief:
    • While upholding the state’s power to reclaim water bodies and dismissing the appeals, the Court severely criticized state authorities and municipal bodies whose flawed revenue alterations and building approvals misled innocent purchasers.
    • To prevent severe financial injury and homelessness for families who purchased flats in good faith, the Supreme Court directed the Chief Secretary of Tamil Nadu and the District Collector of Tiruvallur to allot a vacant, commensurate alternative site to the flat owners’ association within six months prior to the demolition of the 0.22-acre construction.
  • Remedies and Final Outcome:
    • The civil appeals filed by the flat buyer and the mortgagee bank were dismissed.
    • The flat owners and the bank were granted liberty to pursue independent civil and criminal remedies for compensation against the developer, landowner, and mortgagor.
    • The State Government was granted freedom to conclude disciplinary and criminal proceedings against erring officials complicit in the fraudulent patta grant.

2026 INSC 1146

S. Gururaj v. The Additional Chief Secretary/Commissioner of Land Administration and Others (D.O.J. 16.10.2026)

2026 INSC 1146 click here to view full text of judgment

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Enhancing Compensation for Severe Motor Accident Disabilities

October 18, 2026 No Comments

These civil appeals arose from a common judgment of the Kerala High Court modifying a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal award concerning a severe accident on October 22, 2016, involving two scooter riders. The first appellant (Sunil Kumar, a pillion rider) suffered debilitating head injuries resulting in total dependency, while the second appellant (Sreejith K.S., the driver) suffered multiple fractures and nerve injuries affecting his arm. Dissatisfied with the extent of enhancement granted by the High Court, both claimants approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and substantially enhanced the compensation for both appellants. The Court held that when injuries cause cognitive dysfunction or total loss of earning capacity, assessment must shift from strict medical disability percentages to 100% functional disability. Furthermore, the Court established that future attendant/bystander charges for lifelong care must be calculated using the multiplier method, and recognized additional compensation for loss of marriage prospects in young injured claimants.

  • Functional Disability vs. Medical Disability:
    • Reaffirming principles from Shankar Dutt and Jithendran, the Supreme Court emphasized that courts must evaluate the real-world impact of injuries on an individual’s earning capacity and daily life rather than relying solely on medical board percentages.
    • For the first appellant (pillion rider), despite a 75.5% medical disability certificate, his severe head and brain injuries rendered him totally dependent for life, justifying a 100% functional disability For the second appellant (driver), functional disability was assessed at 80% due to permanent impairment of his arm.
  • Multiplier Method for Attendant/Bystander Charges:
    • Rejecting inadequate lump-sum bystander awards, the Court ruled that lifelong attendant charges must be factored using the multiplier method (matching the appropriate multiplier for the claimant’s age), as it effectively accounts for inflation, wage growth, and longevity.
  • Loss of Marriage Prospects:
    • Recognizing that the second appellant was an energetic 22-year-old youth at the time of the accident, the Court awarded 5,00,000/- specifically under the head of loss of future prospects of marriage, following the precedent in Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar.
  • Future Medical Expenses:
    • The Court upheld and reasonably scaled up future medical expenses to 10,00,000/- for the first appellant and Rs. 8,00,000/- for the second appellant to cover continuous long-term medical care.
  • Final Compensation and Directions:
    • First Appellant (Sunil Kumar): Total compensation was enhanced to 77,84,394/-, resulting in an additional payable amount of Rs. 41,61,750/-.
    • Second Appellant (Sreejith K.S.): Total compensation was enhanced to 69,60,880/-, resulting in an additional payable amount of Rs. 41,90,216/-.
    • The insurance company was directed to deposit the enhanced amounts with 5% interest per annum from the date of the claim petition within 6 weeks for direct bank transfer by the Tribunal.
2026 INSC 1145
Sunil Kumar (Totally Disable Rep. by Wife) v. IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Company Ltd. (D.O.J. 15.10.2026)

2026 INSC 1145 click here to view full text of judgment

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Guardianship vs. Usurpation: Striking Down Illegal Gifts of Temple Inam Land to the State

October 18, 2026 No Comments

These appeals, filed by devotees of the Nagapalayam Mariamman-Ponnachiamman Temple, challenged the Madras High Court’s dismissal of a writ petition concerning the alienation of temple property. A temporary trustee of the temple had executed a gift deed on August 30, 2017, transferring 1 acre and 10 cents of temple inam land to the Government of Tamil Nadu for the construction of a Taluk Office. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court’s order, and declared the gift deed null and void. The Court held that the State, acting as a statutory custodian under the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, cannot accept gifts of temple property or convert its role as a protector into a beneficiary. Although the Court declined to demolish the Taluk Office building constructed with public funds, it ordered the State to pay a revised monthly lease rent with arrears and penalized the State with costs for defending an unlawful transaction.

  • Character of Temple Property and Statutory Bar:
    • The subject land was an inam land granted for the support and maintenance of the deity under Inam Title Deed No. 388.
    • Under Section 41(1) of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (1959 Act), a gift of an inam property is expressly declared null and void, and unlike other transactions, the statute consciously withholds any possibility of subsequent validation or sanction for a gift.
    • Registration of the gift deed was also barred under Section 22-A of the Registration Act, 1908.
  • Fiduciary Duty of Trustees and Role of the State:
    • Trustees (whether permanent or temporary) are bound by Sections 27 and 28 of the 1959 Act to manage temple assets with ordinary prudence and fidelity; a gratuitous gift confers no benefit on the institution and violates their fiduciary duty.
    • The State is a statutory custodian and regulator of religious properties, not an owner; accepting a gift of temple land under the guise of administrative convenience or public purpose offends the 1959 Act.
  • Condemnation of State Conduct:
    • The Supreme Court strongly criticized the State Government for aggressively defending the invalid gift deed across judicial forums for years and only conceding its illegality after being specifically directed by the Supreme Court.
  • Equitable Relief and Lease Arrangements:
    • Because a public Taluk Office building had already been constructed on the land using public funds, the Court refused to annul the lease entirely.
    • However, applying the formula established by the Fair Rent Committee and government orders based on local market values (Rs. 167/- per sq. ft.), the Supreme Court enhanced and rounded off the monthly lease rent to 31,000/- per month, payable with arrears from March 8, 2019, to be revised every three years under Section 34-A.
  • Final Directions and Costs:
    • The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, declared the gift deed void, ordered the State to pay arrears of rent within three months, and imposed costs of Rs. 1,00,000/- on the State payable to the Temple.

2026 INSC 1144

K. Ramalingam and Others v. Government of Tamil Nadu Rep. by its Secretary and Others (D.O.J. 16.10.2026)

2026 INSC 1144 click here to view full text of judgment

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